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STUDENT LOAN DERIVATIVES: IMPROVING ON INCOME-BASED
APPROACHES TO FINANCING LAW SCHOOL
BENJAMIN M. LEFF* & HEATHER HUGHES**†
I. INTRODUCTION
EXTENSIVE, public discussion surrounds the high cost of legal educa-tion and student debt levels, yet very few critics of degree-cost show
creativity in thinking about the optimal mechanism for funding a legal
education.  In recent years, numerous policy-makers, investors, and aca-
demics have been searching for ways to tie students’ financing obligations
to post-graduate income rather than interest rates.1  The federal govern-
ment currently offers income-based repayment options for student loan
borrowers.2  Private investors and policymakers advocate for so-called in-
come-share agreements: agreements under which investors provide capital
to students in exchange for a share of students’ future incomes.  These
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Georgetown Tax Law and Public Finance Workshop, and the College of William
and Mary School of Law Faculty Scholarship Series.
1. For example, Senator Marco Rubio and Representative Tom Petri pro-
posed legislation in 2014 that would make what they call “income share agree-
ments” enforceable. See Investing in Student Success Act, H.R. 4436, 113th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2014).  Similar legislation was introduced in the House in 2015 by Repre-
sentatives Todd Young and Jared Polis that modified some provisions of the Ru-
bio/Petri legislation. See Investing in Student Success Act, H.R. 3432, 114th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2015).
2. In 1993, Congress enacted a program under which student borrowers
could limit their loan repayments to a fixed percentage of their income, with the
ability for any remaining balance on their loans to be forgiven after twenty-five
years. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a, 4021
(2012).  The current version of this program, called Pay As You Earn (PAYE), per-
mits borrowers to limit repayment to 10% of income after an exemption of 150%
of the federal poverty level. See Income-Contingent Repayment Plans, 34 C.F.R.
§ 685.209(a) (2016).  Graduates who have been employed by nonprofit or govern-
ment employers can have the remaining balance of their loans forgiven after ten
years. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2012).
Graduates who have a remaining balance on their loans left after twenty years can
have it forgiven regardless of the character of their employer. See id.
§ 685.209(a)(6). See generally JASON DELISLE & ALEXANDER HOLT, NEW AM. EDUC.,
ZERO MARGINAL COST: MEASURING SUBSIDIES FOR GRADUATE EDUCATION IN THE PUB-
LIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM 3 (2014) [hereinafter DELISLE & HOLT,
ZERO MARGINAL COST], available at https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/
759-zero-marginal-cost/ZeroMarginalCost_140910_DelisleHolt.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/9YJE-JLW8]; John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financ-
ing of Higher Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229 (2016).
(99)
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existing approaches to income-based finance are problematic.  The gov-
ernment programs create incentives for students to over-borrow and
schools to overcharge by focusing government funds on those students
who borrow the most,3 and some fear the government programs may not
continue to be available.4  Private “income-share agreements”—which
were traditionally called “human capital contracts”5—face legal and practi-
cal problems as investors make initial investments to fund students’ educa-
tion that they then must recover from the student’s income under
contracts that may be practically difficult—and legally problematic—to
enforce.6
This Article introduces a new and innovative approach to financing
law school: the Income-Based Repayment Swap (IBR Swap).  The IBR
Swap combines structural and financial advantages of derivatives with the
appeal of income-based approaches to financing law school.7  The IBR
Swap uses a derivative structure to enable income-based payment for edu-
cation that does not (1) rely on taxpayer subsidies or (2) implicate the
practical and legal impediments associated with human capital contracts.8
IBR Swaps coordinate with existing, traditional student loans such that the
investors who provide the IBR Swap to students do not have to provide up-
front capital as part of the transaction.  Instead, every month an institu-
tional counterparty makes a fixed payment to a student that the student
uses to pay off student loans; the student makes a reciprocal payment to
the institutional counterparty of a percentage of income.
Because the IBR Swap does not involve an initial disbursement to the
student, it solves two sets of problems that plague human capital con-
tracts.9  First, because no capital is initially placed at risk, the cost of collec-
3. See, e.g., DELISLE & HOLT, ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note 2, at 2.
4. See, e.g., Josh Mitchell, Student-Debt Forgiveness Plans Skyrocket, Raising Fears
over Costs, Higher Tuition, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303887804579503894256072308 [https://perma.cc/N7AM-
JBVW].  Others are more optimistic about governmental IBR programs’ contribu-
tion to the education-financing problem. See, e.g., Kevin Carey, A Quiet Revolution
in Helping Lift the Burden of Student Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2015, http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/upshot/a-quiet-revolution-in-helping-lift-the-burden-
of-student-debt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B324-TT8N].
5. See, e.g., Miguel Palacios, Human Capital Contracts: “Equity-Like” Instruments
for Financing Higher Education, POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 16,
2002 [hereinafter Palacios, Human Capital Contracts], at 1, 3–4, available at http://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa462.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5
Y4-RDFN].
6. For a further discussion of human capital contracts, see infra notes 12–29
and accompanying text.
7. Readers may find the IBR Swap concept relevant to higher education con-
texts beyond law school; the authors find it best to begin to think through the IBR
Swap using the institutional context with which we are most familiar.
8. See infra notes 113–72 and accompanying text.
9. In this Article, we use the term human capital contract to describe a conven-
tional income-share agreement, in which one party disburses funds to a student,
and the student pays a percentage of future income to the disbursing party for
2
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tion and risk of nonpayment decrease dramatically, reducing costs for all
parties involved.  Investors are not in the position of trying to enforce an
unsecured payment obligation for return on a sizable initial investment.
Rather, if students default on IBR Swaps, they are still obligated to lenders.
Second, the unique structure of the IBR Swap reduces the legal uncer-
tainty associated with human capital contracts.  Because of the lack of ini-
tial disbursement, an IBR Swap is not debt and therefore is not subject to
the regulations on debt or student loans.  For the same reason, an IBR
Swap is not “equity” in a person, as some have claimed about human capi-
tal contracts.10  Because swaps are a recognized financial instrument cate-
gory under current law, it is possible that IBR Swaps could become a
reality without new legislation or other law reform.
But like other income-share agreements, IBR Swaps raise a host of
serious concerns about differential treatment of prospective students
based on criteria related to assumptions about earning power.  Many ob-
ject to human capital contracts on the grounds that they encourage a mar-
ket which, if unregulated, might provide capital to men on more favorable
terms than women and to students from more privileged backgrounds on
more favorable terms than students from less privileged backgrounds, sim-
ply because investors believe that the more privileged student is a better
investment.  In addition, income-share agreements potentially obscure the
non-financial value of higher education to the individual and the collec-
tive value of higher education to society.11
The IBR Swap does not alleviate these concerns.  If anything, it com-
pounds them by introducing a derivative structure that adds efficiency to
the income-share agreement concept, potentially generating a market in
financial instruments backed by student payment obligations.  This Article
presents the IBR Swap in order to incite critical consideration of both the
potential and the limitations of private-market mechanisms for law school
finance.  As such, it should inspire critical assessment of what is the best
and most impactful role for the government in ensuring access to law
school.
Under current law, the IBR Swap structure removes some regulatory
uncertainty and clears the way for a market in income-share agreements,
even without new legislation.  But ethical, distributional, and other ques-
tions surrounding the IBR Swap concept remain and warrant careful con-
sideration.  This Article merely begins the (daunting) task of thoroughly
addressing all of the various regulatory tradeoffs that are triggered by mov-
ing from a debt-based system of financing higher education to one that
interacts meaningfully with students’ post-graduate income.  Nonetheless,
we do identify and address several important regulatory challenges, and
some period of time.  We use the term income-share agreement to describe both
human capital contracts and our innovation, the IBR Swap.
10. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Daniela Kraiem, The Cost of Opportunity: Student Debt and Social
Mobility, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 689 (2015).
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discuss one in some detail: the differential pricing of income-share
agreements.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II introduces human capital
contracts and presents the IBR Swap concept.  It explains the IBR Swap
and how it is structurally similar to existing swaps in the market.  Part III
presents the benefits of IBR Swaps, explaining how these contracts
can—better than the current student loan model—align costs with bene-
fits, generate information, discipline schools with respect to costs, and po-
tentially enable the government to advance education accessibility at a
lower cost to the taxpayer.  Part IV considers the current legal state of
affairs.  Part V examines important issues that should be addressed in any
future regulation of IBR Swaps and other income-share agreements.
II. HUMAN CAPITAL CONTRACTS AND INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT SWAPS
A. Human Capital Contracts
For more than half a century, economists have dreamed of a novel
way to fund higher education.  Instead of using traditional debt, private
investors could provide capital to students in exchange for a percentage of
each student’s future earnings.  A “human capital contract” is a kind of
“equity-like” interest in a person’s future earnings.12  In a human capital
contract, “a student who wants to attend college, but does not have the
resources to do so, signs a contract with an investor in which he commits
to pay [a percentage] of his income for [a period of time] after gradua-
tion in exchange for [an upfront payment] received today to pay for tui-
tion fees and living expenses.”13
Economists point to a footnote in a 1945 article by Milton Friedman
and Simon Kuznets as the origin of the idea to use human capital con-
tracts to finance higher education.14  Friedman and Kuznets complained
that “investment in training is not governed by the usual profit incentives”
because investors could not capture the expected return on an investment
in the education of stranger.15  Because future income is so variable, ad-
vancing a student money to finance education is risky.  The student may
earn enough to pay you back with interest, but may well not earn enough
and default on the obligation.  If that happens, the lender has very little
recourse, since the student has no property to offer as security in the case
of default.  Because of the variability of future income, debt is an ill-suited
12. MIGUEL PALACIOS LLERAS, INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL: A CAPITAL MAR-
KETS APPROACH TO STUDENT FUNDING 1 (2004) [hereinafter PALACIOS, INVESTING IN
HUMAN CAPITAL].
13. Id.
14. MILTON FRIEDMAN & SIMON KUZNETS, Income in the Professions and in Other
Pursuits, in INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 62, 90 n.20 (1945).
15. Id. at 89.
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mechanism for financing education.16  When business ventures are risky,
and when they have little property to offer as collateral, it is common for
businesses to raise capital by offering investors an ownership interest in
exchange for their investments.  That way, while the risk of loss is greater
than in the case of debt, it is balanced by the ability to receive higher
returns if the business venture is successful.  Friedman and Kuznets’s foot-
note describes “an analogy that at first blush may seem fantastic”—“if indi-
viduals sold ‘stock’ in themselves, i.e., obligated themselves to pay a fixed
proportion of future earnings, investors could ‘diversify’ their holdings
and balance capital appreciations against capital losses.”17  In other words,
if investors could participate in the upside gain of financially successful
students, they could use that money to offset losses caused by financially
unsuccessful students, and the result should be a lower cost of capital for
the average student.
Friedman was not done with the idea in 1945.  He returned to it in
1955, in an article that was influential in Congress’s later decision to offer
federal guarantees in order to foster a student loan market.18  This time,
Friedman argued more fully that this problem with fixed-rate debt as the
sole source of capital for education would not exist if it were possible for
investors to take an “equity interest” in the future earnings of a student.19
So why do students not find such “equity” investors?  Friedman concedes
that “[t]here seems no legal obstacle to private contracts of this kind, even
though they are economically equivalent to the purchase of a share in an
individual’s earning capacity and thus to partial slavery.”20  But Friedman
recognized a host of difficulties with such a contract.  Primary among
them, according to Friedman, is the fact that they might be hard to en-
force, since there is no property to use as collateral and the person subject
to the contract may well move around to avoid collection.21
But he also commented:
I have never been able to persuade myself that a major role has
not also been played by the cumulative effect of such factors as
the novelty of the idea, the reluctance to think of investment in
human beings as strictly comparable to investment in physical as-
sets, the resultant likelihood of irrational public condemnation
16. See generally Bas Jacobs & Sweder J.G. van Wijnbergen, Capital-Market Fail-
ure, Adverse Selection, and Equity Financing of Higher Education, 63 FINANZARCHIV 1
(2007); Palacios, Human Capital Contracts, supra note 5.
17. FRIEDMAN & KUZNETS, supra note 14, at 90 n.20.
18. See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). But see J.R. Walsh, Capital
Concept Applied to Man, 49 Q.J. ECON. 255, 278–84 (1935) (purporting to show that
there was no under-investment in “vocational” education in medicine, engineer-
ing, academics, or masters degrees, and that law was one area in which it appeared
that there was under-investment).
19. Friedman, supra note 18, at 137–38.
20. Id. at 138.
21. Id.
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of such contracts . . . and legal and conventional limitation on
the kind of investments that may be made by the financial in-
termediaries that would be best suited to engage in such
investments . . . .22
In other words, it may be that the impediments to these human capital
contracts are not inherent in the market, but are external, caused either
by “irrational” conventional attitudes or laws.
Even if the concept of human capital contracts has a long history,
actual human capital contracts have only begun to appear in the market
recently.23  But their modest appearance has been accompanied by a sig-
nificant amount of attention by investors, academics,24 and (most re-
cently) lawmakers.25  While observers of the contemporary explosion of
22. Id. at 138–39.
23. Companies that have recently begun to offer investments that are argua-
bly human capital contracts include Fantex, Upstart, Lumni, Pave, the recently
dissolved My Rich Uncle, 13th Avenue Funding, Base Human Capital, and Cumu-
lus Funding. See About Lumni, LUMNI, http://www.lumni.net/about/ [https://per
ma.cc/SFZ3-2ZX7] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016); About Pave, PAVE, https://www.pave
.com/about [https://perma.cc/SY3B-7D5D] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016); Home,
13TH AVENUE FUNDING, http://www.13thavenuefunding.org/ [https://perma.cc/
KDQ5-BCNB] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016); How It Works, BASE HUM. CAP., http://
www.base-hc.com/#option_title [https://perma.cc/8DCT-KARK] (last visited Feb.
23, 2015); MyRichUncle, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MyRichUncle
[https://perma.cc/R7XM-5HZ3] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016); Our Product, CUMU-
LUS FUNDING, http://cumulusfunding.com/our-product/ [https://perma.cc/
J7EF-KU45] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016); Overview, FANTEX, https://fantex.com/
how-it-works [https://perma.cc/HE2A-BDKG] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016); UP-
START, https://www.upstart.com/ [https://perma.cc/EK28-826S] (last visited Feb.
23, 2016) (no longer offering human capital contract-like loans).
24. See, e.g., PALACIOS, INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 12; MIGUEL
PALACIOS, TONIO DESORRENTO & ANDREW P. KELLY, AM. ENTER. INST., INVESTING IN
VALUE, SHARING RISK: FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION THROUGH INCOME SHARE
AGREEMENTS (2014) [hereinafter PALACIOS ET AL., INVESTING IN VALUE, SHARING
RISK], available at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/-investing-in
-value-sharing-in-risk-financing-higher-education-through-inome-share-agreements
_083548906610.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH93-DC6H]; Jacobs & van Wijnbergen,
supra note 16; Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun Abraham, Options for Student Borrow-
ers: A Derivatives-Based Proposal to Protect Students and Control Debt-Fueled Inflation in
the Higher Education Market, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67 (2010); Shu-Yi Oei &
Diane Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share Agreements, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 681 (2015) [hereinafter Oei & Ring, Human Equity?]; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M.
Ring, The New “Human Equity” Transactions, 5 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 266 (2014) [here-
inafter Oei & Ring, The New “Human Equity” Transactions]; Palacios, Human Capital
Contracts, supra note 5; Jeff Schwartz, The Corporatization of Personhood, 2015 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1119; Ritika Kapadia, Note, A Solution to the Student Loan Crisis: Human
Capital Contracts, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 591 (2015); Matthew Soldner,
The Potential Market for Income Share Agreements Among Low-Income Undergraduates, IS-
SUE BRIEF (Am. Inst. for Research, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 2015, available at http://www
.air.org/sites/default/files/downloads/report/Income-Share-Agreements-ISAs-Po
tential-Among-Low-Income-Undergraduates-Sept-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YH78-TYB5].
25. See H.R. 3432, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2014).
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human capital contract-like financial innovation disagree about many
things, they all appear to agree that the current legal and regulatory envi-
ronment creates significant uncertainty and is therefore an impediment to
the development of a market for human capital contracts or similar finan-
cial products.26
Perhaps the most vocal, recent advocate of human capital contracts is
Miguel Palacios, a professor of finance at Vanderbilt University’s business
school and a founder of one of the first human capital contract providers,
Lumni.27 Lumni provides capital upfront in exchange for a percentage of
future income for students who show unusual promise.  Lumni purports
to be currently financing students in the United States, but Lumni started
in Chile, where apparently the legal environment is less uncertain, and
Palacios has complained that legal uncertainty is a significant barrier to
the development of a market for human capital contracts in the United
States.28  Palacios is not alone in believing the time is ripe to develop a
market for human capital contracts or other similar financial instruments.
Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Shiller touted what he calls “in-
come-linked loans” in a 2003 book.29  Recently, members of both houses
of Congress have noticed the potential for what they call income-share agree-
ments, proposing legislation in both the House and Senate to “provide the
legal framework necessary for the growth of innovative private financing
options for students to fund postsecondary education . . . .”30  The pre-
mise of the legislation is that various types of income-share agreements are
potentially beneficial, but that the current legal environment does not per-
mit them or is uncertain enough to raise their cost unnecessarily.  In this
Article, we use the term income-share agreement to refer to the whole range
of financial instruments that resemble human capital contracts, including
the IBR Swap.
B. The IBR Swap
This Article presents a relatively simple innovation to the human capi-
tal contract, which, to the authors’ knowledge, has never been proposed
before.31  We call this innovation an Income-Based Repayment Swap (IBR
26. For example, the Upstart blog, in explaining why Upstart discontinued its
income-based funding operations, stated, “while many regulatory and policy efforts
are underway to facilitate the development of the market, these efforts will likely
take many years.”  Oei & Ring, The New “Human Equity” Transactions, supra note 24,
at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Miguel Palacios, VAND. U., http://www2.owen.vanderbilt.edu/miguel
.palacios/ [https://perma.cc/P6YP-3CEL] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
28. Our Story, LUMNI, http://www.lumniusa.net/about/our-story [https://per
ma.cc/98MP-SU9Y] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
29. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY 140 (2003).
30. H.R. 4436; H.R. 3432.
31. While no one has proposed a swap structure for human capital contracts,
Michael Macchiarola and Arun Abraham proposed a financial instrument that has
7
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Swap).  It solves a surprising number of both practical problems and legal
uncertainty associated with human capital contracts.
An IBR Swap, as we present it, is a contract between a student in a
three-year juris doctor (J.D.) program at some United States law school
(the student counterparty) and a fund or financial institution  (the institu-
tional counterparty) under which the student pays a percentage of income
and the institution covers the costs of the student’s law school loans in
return.  The institution could be any unrelated third-party investor.32
The student borrows money to pay for education from the govern-
ment, just as students do now, taking out the same type of loan as any
other student seeking funding for graduate education.33  Let us imagine
that a student borrows $150,000 to pay for three years of law school.
Those loans come with a federally guaranteed fixed interest rate of 6.8%
and a repayment schedule of ten years.34  Repayment is scheduled to be-
gin six months after graduation.  The student’s monthly loan repayments
would be $1,726.  The student takes that $150,000 and pays it to the school
in tuition, just as any other student would.
But simultaneously with taking out loans and paying tuition, the stu-
dent enters into an IBR Swap agreement with an institutional
counterparty.  The institutional counterparty agrees to pay the student
$1,726 per month for 120 months (ten years) starting on the same day
their student-loan obligations begin.  In other words, the institutional
counterparty agrees to pay the student the exact amount needed to pay
back their loans for exactly the same term as the their loans.
With the institutional counterparty agreeing to pay the student
counterparty $1,726 per month for 120 months, the student agrees to pay
the institution 15% of their income for the same 120 months.  So, at some
an “option” feature. See Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 24.  Miguel Palacios
proposed using an option structure in a slightly different way. See PALACIOS, IN-
VESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 12, at 81–101.
32. One possibility, of course, is for the institutional counterparty to be a law
school, a fund created by a number of law schools, or some sort of charitable inves-
tor.  These possibilities introduce a number of unique questions and concerns,
however, and so for simplicity’s sake, we assume at the outset that the institutional
counterparty is a generic institutional investor.
33. Under current law, any student attending an accredited law school in the
United States can borrow from the government any amount up to a school’s total
cost of attendance as unsubsidized graduate loans. See Subsidized and Unsubsidized
Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized [https://perma.cc/NSS2-2WMP] (last visited
Feb. 23, 2016).
34. For simplicity’s sake, we use the 6.8% rate that has applied to most gov-
ernment direct graduate or professional school student loans for several years,
even though under current law the interest rate for new loans is tied to the ten-
year Treasury Note.  For loans disbursed between July 1, 2014, and June 30, 2015,
that rate is 6.21%, and for loans disbursed between July 1, 2015, and the present,
the rate is 5.84%. See id.; Interest Rates and Fees, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/interest-rates [https://perma.cc/
73CJ-EAEC] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
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set day in each month, the institution pays the student $1,726, and the
student pays the institution 15% of the student’s income.  If the student is
making $120,000 per year ($10,000 per month), then the student would
owe the institution $1,500 each month.  In its basic structure, this is a sim-
ple swap transaction.
A swap is a transaction in which the parties, called “counterparties,”
exchange cash flows or obligations.35  A swap is a derivative—an agree-
ment to transfer risk, the value of which is derived from the value of an
underlying asset.36  The underlying asset in derivatives transactions may be
any tradable instrument: an interest rate, a commodity, a currency, etc.37
The parties trade payment obligations (or cash flows) at specified payment
dates during the agreed-upon term of the transaction.38  The payment ob-
ligations that the parties exchange are called the “legs” of a swap.39  Many
different kinds of swaps exist in the market.40  The IBR Swap involves ex-
changing “fixed” payments—contractual obligations to a lender—for
“floating” payments—a contractual obligation to pay a percentage of
income.41
The payments that swap counterparties exchange are based on a “no-
tional amount”—a stipulated “principal” amount.42  As the International
Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA) states, “the notional amount[ ]
of a derivative contract is a hypothetical underlying quantity upon which
35. See Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVA-
TIVES ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/4YQL-
HPNM] (last visited Feb. 23, 2016) [hereinafter ISDA FAQs]; see also JOHN C.
HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 757 (6th ed. 2006); Saul S. Co-
hen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993, 1997–2000 (1995);
Times Topics: Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/d/derivatives/index.html [https://perma.cc/XDQ4-J59U]
(last updated Feb. 11, 2016) (explaining what derivatives are and referring readers
to various recent articles about derivatives).
36. See ISDA FAQs, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. For example, there are, among others: currency swaps (in which the par-
ties exchange principle and interest payments in one currency for principle and
interest payments in a different currency); commodity swaps (in which parties ex-
change a fluctuating market price for a fixed price of some commodity over a
designated time period); and credit default swaps (in which one party pays a fee to
the other party in return for compensation for default, however defined, by some
reference entity). See generally id.
41. The student-loan leg of the swap is fixed in the sense that it is denomi-
nated by contract, not in the sense that the payment amounts necessarily are fixed;
they may be fixed or variable depending on whether the student borrows on a
fixed or floating rate basis from lenders.
42. In an IBR Swap, the counterparties could stipulate the “notional amount”
to reflect the student’s full obligation to law school lenders, or this amount also
could be some portion of the student’s law school loans.
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interest rate or other payment obligations are computed.”43  Furthermore,
the reciprocal payments may or may not be netted.44
There are several different ways to classify derivatives.45  Some classify
derivatives based on the underlying assets or metrics involved.46  Others
focus on whether a derivative is exchange-traded or over-the-counter
(OTC),47 along with whether it is booked with a clearinghouse or not.48
The IBR Swap would be an OTC (as opposed to an exchange-traded)
swap.  Simply put, an OTC derivative is done directly between the
counterparties, without involvement of an exchange.49
For purposes of understanding the IBR Swap, this Section draws on
recent legal scholarship that classifies derivatives according to
counterparty motivation.50  We can classify derivatives among those in
which (1) both counterparties are hedging, (2) one counterparty is hedg-
ing and the other is speculating, and (3) both counterparties are speculat-
ing.51  The IBR Swap involves a student counterparty that is hedging a
preexisting risk, and an institutional counterparty that is speculating on
students’ future income, thus it is in the speculator-hedger category.52  To
explain, in some contexts, derivatives serve a hedging purpose: they can
offset or hedge against preexisting risks, as does insurance.53  The ability
to acquire insurance can offset loss; hence, buying insurance reduces risk.
43. ISDA FAQs, supra note 35.  In a swap, the counterparties do not exchange
the notional amount.  See id.; Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-first Century
Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5 n.12 (2011) [hereinafter Lynch, Derivatives].
44. As ISDA explains: “Payment netting reduces payments due on the same
date and in the same currency to a single net payment.  Payment netting is essen-
tially identical to the legal concept of set-off.”  ISDA FAQs, supra note 35.
45. See generally Lynch, Derivatives, supra note 43; Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling
by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 67 (2011) [hereinafter Lynch, Gambling]; Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against a De-
rivative Disaster: The Case for Decentralized Risk Management, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1575
(2013).
46. See Lynch, Derivatives, supra note 43, at 34–38.
47. See Lynch, Gambling, supra note 45, at 75–76.
48. Id.
49. See I PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULA-
TION 74–75 (I PHILIP MCBRIDE, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & CARY C. BOSHAMER, COMMOD-
ITIES REGULATION (3d ed. 1998), successor ed. 2004); see also ISDA FAQs, supra
note 35.  Note that some OTC derivatives are booked with a clearinghouse. Id.  An
IBR Swap would not be subject to regulatory clearinghouse requirements.  See infra
notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
50. See Lynch, Gambling, supra note 45; Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Specu-
lators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J.
701 (1999) [hereinafter Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators].
51. See Lynch, Gambling, supra note 45, at 71.
52. The possibility that a student would not have incurred risk but for the
existence of an IBR Swap program does not affect this designation. See id. at
79–82.
53. See id. at 71, 75–82; see also I JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 49, at 28–29;
M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance”, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 1–5
(2009); Manns, supra note 45.
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In other contexts, derivatives serve a speculative purpose: they can create
payment obligations based on the parties’ (contrasting) predictions of fu-
ture events, which creates risk that did not previously exist.54
The literature further divides derivatives that fall into the speculator-
hedger category in which the speculator assumes risk for a premium—the
insurance model55—and those in which speculators expect to leverage su-
perior information or predictive capacity—the information arbitrage
model.56  IBR Swaps could follow either an insurance model or an infor-
54. Commentators often describe derivatives as bets, in a literal sense.  They
are agreements under which one party will pay the other, depending on whether
certain events occur.  Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origins of the 2008
Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) [hereinafter Stout, Derivatives] (stat-
ing that “[t]he value of a derivative agreement is ‘derived’ from the performance
of the underlying financial phenomenon, just as the value of a betting ticket at the
racetrack is ‘derived’ from the performance of a horse in a race”).  Betting can
serve very different purposes in different market contexts.  Regulatory and market
challenges surrounding derivatives concern the fact that speculative betting can
reduce welfare by exposing market actors to new risks without a compensating
increase in returns.  See id. at 8; Lynch, Gambling, supra note 45, at 93–94.  Bets that
are hedging, or serve an insurance function, in contrast, involve transfer of risk for
a premium.  “In the parlance of economic theory,” Stout explains, “speculative
derivatives trading is a form of rent-seeking—trying to acquire wealth not by creating
it, but by taking existing wealth from someone else.”  Stout, Derivatives, supra, at 9.
However, many defend speculative derivatives on grounds that they provide other
benefits such as greater liquidity and price discovery. See Lynch, Gambling, supra
note 45, at 74.
55. Under an insurance model, counterparties agree to swap payments based
on a formula that slightly favors the risk purchaser—paying, in essence, a premium
for transferring the risk.  In the case of a derivative that follows the insurance
model, the terms of the derivative will favor, to some degree, the speculating
counterparty.  Such speculators earn profits in aggregate, over time, by entering
many contracts and then allowing the favorable terms, combined with probabilities
and events over time, to yield a return. See Lynch, Gambling, supra note 45, at
80–82.  The speculating counterparty does not receive a “price” embedded in the
contract, like an insurance premium, necessarily.  Rather, the counterparties may
calculate the amounts of payments to be swapped, or other terms of the swap,
using formulas designed to slightly favor the speculating counterparty. See id. at 79
n.49.
56. Under an information arbitrage model, risk purchasers invest in generat-
ing better information than their counterparties have.  In the case of a speculator-
hedger derivative that follows the information arbitrage model, the speculating
party may not assume risk for a “price.”  Rather, this counterparty may be privy to
superior information about the direction or future value of the underlying asset or
may have better tools or predictive skills.  This kind of speculator counterparty will
enter into a derivative contract with market (not favorable) terms and then wait for
its predictive skills and informational advantages to produce a return. See id. at
79–81.  This counterparty may invest in research and collect and analyze data in a
way that the hedger does not.  The hedger counterparty gets to mitigate risk at
current market rates.  The speculator counterparty gets to leverage the value of its
information and analysis vis-a`-vis a certain type of underlying asset with the numer-
ous hedgers seeking to transfer risk. Id.  Derivatives in which a speculating
counterparty follows the information arbitrage model can contribute to price dis-
covery, helping the market to determine accurate market prices for the underlying
asset.
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mation arbitrage model.  Either way, students benefit from the fact that
the institutional counterparty is able to assume risk and diversify its expo-
sure to student-counterparty earning trajectories.
The pricing of an IBR Swap turns on a prediction of the student’s
future earnings over the term of the swap.  A swap priced to “break even”
would be one in which the predicted average earnings of the student pro-
duce payments to the swap counterparty that exactly match the payments
that the swap counterparty agrees to make to the student.  So, for exam-
ple, if the institutional counterparty has agreed to make monthly pay-
ments of $1,726 to the student for ten years (exactly the amount needed
to service a loan for $150,000 at 6.8% interest), then the parties would
break even if the swap was “priced” at 15% and the student earned
$138,080 per year on average over the ten-year term of the swap.  In that
scenario, the student would pay on average $1,726 per month to the insti-
tutional counterparty and the institutional counterparty would pay the stu-
dent the same $1,726 per month.
But, of course, parties presumably would not price a swap at a perfect
“breakeven price.”  First of all, in an IBR Swap, the two
counterparties—the student counterparty and the institutional
counterparty—assume credit risk associated with the willingness and abil-
ity of the other counterparty to perform.  The student counterparty as-
sumes the risk that the institutional counterparty could default on the
student’s obligations to lenders.  The institutional counterparty assumes
risk that the student counterparty could default on making the income-
based payments.  If either party defaults, the result is that the student is
liable for any payments owed on outstanding student loans.  This credit
risk would have to be incorporated into the price of the swap.  In addition,
institutional counterparties would presumably want to be compensated for
their costs of capital; their payments are likely to be bigger than the stu-
dent’s corresponding payment in the beginning of the swap’s term.  In
addition, institutional counterparties will want to price in some profit for
themselves.
If the student counterparty earns more than expected, there is an
incentive for the student to default on their payment obligations, but the
IBR Swap would be designed to prevent student default in this circum-
stance, giving institutional counterparties all the tools that lenders have to
ensure compliance.57  Conversely, if the student counterparty earns a rela-
tively low income, the IBR Swap has a negative value for the institutional
counterparty and a positive value for the student counterparty.  IBR Swaps
may require regulation—such as capital adequacy requirements and pen-
57. Cf. Patricia Brown, Tax Consequences of Interest Rate Swaps: Characterization by
Function, Not Prejudice, 6 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 122, 131 (1988) (citing U.C.C. § 2-
718(1) (1978)).
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alties for breach—to prevent institutional counterparties from defaulting
on swaps that have a negative value to them.58
III. BENEFITS OF THE IBR SWAP
The current interest in income-share agreements accompanies wide-
spread anxiety about the rising costs of higher education and the recogni-
tion that traditional student loans are significantly burdening students.59
In the law school context, where students can borrow the total cost of
attendance at their institutions, which may be as high as $230,000 for
three years of attendance,60 the situation for graduates is even more pro-
nounced than in other areas.61  Supporters of income-share agreements
argue that market-based financial innovations, like human capital con-
tracts, offer several benefits over traditional debt.
These same benefits apply equally to IBR Swaps.  But there are addi-
tional benefits that are unique to IBR Swaps.  This Section first discusses
benefits that IBR Swaps share with human capital contracts and other simi-
lar instruments.  It includes both benefits over traditional debt and poten-
tial benefits over the current governmental income-based repayment
programs.  It then explains those benefits that arise from unique attributes
of the IBR Swap.
A. Benefits Shared with Other Income-Share Agreements
1. Alignment of Costs with Benefits
The primary benefit of IBR Swaps and other income-share agree-
ments is that they do a better job than debt of aligning the costs of an
58. In addition, contractual terms or regulation may be necessary in IBR
Swaps to reduce moral hazard, as they are in some other derivatives contexts. See
Lynch, Gambling, supra note 45, at 107; Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1034–36 (2007).
59. See Palacios, Human Capital Contracts, supra note 5, at 2.
60. See, e.g., DELISLE & HOLT, ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note 2, at 3
(“[G]raduate students have been able to use the program to finance the entire
cost of their educations . . . without limit since 2006.” (citing Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 20 U.S.C. § 8005 (2006))).
61. Some commentators have focused on the law school context because the
volume of student debt is so large there, and the earnings of law school graduates
are so uneven. See, e.g., JASON DELISLE & ALEX HOLT, NEW AM. FOUND., SAFETY NET
OR WINDFALL?: EXAMINING CHANGES TO INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT FOR FEDERAL STU-
DENT LOANS 10 (2012) [hereinafter DELISLE & HOLT, SAFETY NET OR WINDFALL?],
available at https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2332-safety-net-or-windfall
/NAF_Income_Based_Repayment.18c8a688f03c4c628b6063755ff5dbaa.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/44HG-WXKX]; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, at x
(2012) [hereinafter TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS]; Macchiarola & Abraham,
supra note 24, at 77–79; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Problems with Income Based Repay-
ment, and the Charge of Elitism: Responses to Schrag and Chambliss (Wash. U. St. Louis
Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-06-01, 2013) [hereinafter
Tamanaha, The Problems with Income Based Repayment].
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education to the financial benefit to the student.62  A debt arrangement
defines the cost to students before they know how much money they will
earn post-graduation.  If a student loan program is going to break even,
the interest rate must be high enough for regular borrowers to subsidize
those borrowers who default because they do not earn enough to service
their loans.  Thus, all students who earn enough to avoid default must
subsidize those students who earn too little and default.  But the large
majority of students who earn enough to avoid default pay the same
amount, no matter how much they earn.  For low earners who nonetheless
earn enough to avoid default, the rate can be a very high percentage of
their income.
The IBR Swap solves the problem of variable earnings by retrospec-
tively tailoring the cost of education, so to speak, based on the amount the
graduate actually earns.  Instead of having a single rate that everybody
pays, the rate of repayment is adjusted based on the student’s individual
ability to pay after the fact.  This tailoring of the repayment rate to post-
graduation income means that graduates who earn above the mean in-
come subsidize students who earn below the mean.  Thus, the cost for the
median earner goes down, since above average returns can be captured
from high earners, unlike in a traditional debt arrangement in which
every non-defaulting borrower pays the same (relatively high) rate.
This decrease in cost for median earners could be substantial, de-
pending on the default rate in the traditional loan program.  But for non-
defaulting low earners, the decrease in cost is even more substantial.  Thus,
the primary benefit of income-share agreements is that they dramatically
decrease the cost of education for graduates who end up not earning high
incomes.  If it is true that there is some inherent uncertainty about which
students will be high earners and which will be low earners, this reduction
in the downside risk of low earning is a huge benefit.  It enables students
to decrease the downside financial risk that their educations will not result
in earnings high enough to justify the cost.63
In the law school context, the variation of earnings is extreme.64  Cur-
rently, this problem of extreme variation in earnings among graduates is
62. SHILLER, supra note 29, at 139.
63. If there is no real uncertainty from the student’s perspective, and the stu-
dent’s actions largely determine earnings (through effort, for example), then the
benefits of insuring against downside risk are dramatically reduced.  In this case,
so-called moral hazard could reduce the value of the IBR Swap’s structure. See
infra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
64. According to the National Association of Law Schools (NALP), the distri-
bution of starting salaries of law school graduates is bimodal, with one peak (repre-
senting about 16% of students) making approximately $160,000 and a second
peak (representing about 51% of students) making between $40,000 and $65,000.
See Class of 2013 Bimodal Salary Curve, NALP (July 2013), http://www.nalp.org/
class_of_2013_bimodal_salary_curve [https://perma.cc/6AXE-MRJ7].  This data
excludes graduates working part-time and graduates who are not employed.
Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre survey available data on lifetime earnings by
law school graduates, which shows a similar wide disparity in earnings. See Michael
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at least partially addressed by an expansion of income-based repayment
programs by the Obama Administration.65  But these programs, which are
designed to enable those borrowers who have the most debt and the low-
est income to avoid default, do not do as good a job aligning the costs of
education with the financial benefits derived from it as an IBR Swap.
A governmental income-based repayment option prevents very low-
income students from defaulting, but it does not reduce the cost for me-
dian students.  It also does nothing for students who only borrow part of
the costs of their education, because they do not have enough debt to
trigger the entrance requirements for the program.66  An IBR Swap, on
the other hand, adjusts the amount repaid for one’s education dollar for
dollar based on the ex post financial value of that education, as reflected
in one’s overall income.  Thus, an IBR Swap performs a more precise
matching of ability-to-pay with financial benefit than government income-
based repayment and loan forgiveness programs.
Some proponents of income-share agreements support them because
they believe that income-share agreements have the potential to decrease
the government’s involvement in higher education finance.67  These com-
mentators believe that existing government programs, especially govern-
mental IBR expanded by the Obama Administration, commit taxpayer
funds in ways that can have perverse effects on costs and can potentially
subsidize students whose families could afford to pay without assistance.68
Because IBR Swaps and other income-share agreements subsidize the risk
of low earning graduates with earnings from high-earning graduates, the
need for taxpayers to subsidize low-earning graduates is potentially dimin-
ished.69  And because income-share agreements permit low-earning stu-
dents to pay less, the need for government-subsidized insurance against
Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD.
249, 254 (2014).  For example, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics has
data for all lawyers, which shows that in 2012, the 75th percentile compensation
was about $160,000 (at all levels) and that the 25th percentile was about $70,000.
See Occupational Employment Statistics: Lawyers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (May 2012),
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/oes/2012/may/oes231011.htm [https://per
ma.cc/B9EB-EFY6] (last modified Mar. 29, 2013).
65. See, e.g., Carey, supra note 4.
66. This feature of the government’s IBR programs creates strong incentives
for students to over-borrow.  It could be corrected in the government program by
tailoring the eligibility requirements for the income-based repayment programs to
the amount borrowed. See, e.g., DELISLE & HOLT, ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note
2, at 21–23.
67. See, e.g., Palacios, Human Capital Contracts, supra note 5, at 3.
68. See, e.g., DELISLE & HOLT, SAFETY NET OR WINDFALL?, supra note 61, at 10;
DELISLE & HOLT, ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note 2, at 21.
69. The government subsidies are currently almost exclusively to be found in
the government’s IBR programs, since the current system of federal student loan
financing (excluding the loan forgiveness programs) currently operates at a profit
for the government.
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low earnings in the form of income-based repayment or loan forgiveness is
dramatically reduced.70
But even for those who believe that higher education should be subsi-
dized by taxpayers, IBR Swaps and other income-share agreements offer
an opportunity to clarify the discourse around governmental support for
education and redirect resources where they will do the most good.71  If
the existence of a market for IBR Swaps would diminish the problem of
low-earning graduates being unable to pay for their higher education,
then that would enable the government to focus its resources on providing
educational opportunities to those who need them the most.  For exam-
ple, the government could redirect its efforts and funds to provide grants
for students without means, or to fund state educational institutions or
other programs that are targeted to increase access to higher education
for those students who have barriers to access.  In the law school context, a
market for IBR Swaps would enable the government to withdraw from its
current loan forgiveness programs (at least for future students) and
refocus its resources on making legal education better, cheaper, and more
accessible to low-income and minority students—if those are the policy
objectives the government chooses to pursue.  Alternatively, the govern-
ment could focus its resources on making higher education, and even law
school, cheaper and more accessible for all students.
2. Information for Students
The second most often touted potential benefit of income-share
agreements is their ability to communicate information to students seek-
ing an education.72  Advocates for human capital contracts emphasize in-
70. Some argue that the current governmental IBR represents a significant
subsidy in the law school context. See, e.g., DELISLE & HOLT, SAFETY NET OR WIND-
FALL?, supra note 61, at 1; Tamanaha, The Problems with Income Based Repayment,
supra note 61.  For example, a law student who borrows $125,000 will qualify
for the government’s income-based repayment and loan forgiveness programs
even if the student earns up to $172,620 per year.  (The math here is slightly
simplified—$125,000 at 6.8% for ten years is $17,262 per month; a student quali-
fies for PAYE if payments under the standard ten-year payment option exceed 10%
of annual income.)  However, qualifying for income-based repayment does not
necessarily represent a subsidy from the federal government, since loan forgive-
ness comes after ten years only for students who work for that whole period in
public interest jobs.  For all others, loan forgiveness only comes after twenty years,
after which time many students will have paid back the full amount of their loans.
71. See, e.g., LAUREN ASHER, DIANE CHENG & JESSICA THOMPSON, INST. FOR
COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, SHOULD ALL STUDENT LOAN PAYMENTS BE INCOME-
DRIVEN?: TRADE-OFFS AND CHALLENGES 10–18 (2014), available at http://ticas.org/
sites/default/files/pub_files/TICAS_IDR_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J9S8-24AT]; Stephen Crawford & Robert G. Sheets, Managing Risk, Reaping Reward:
The Case for a Comprehensive Income-Based Loan System, in REINVENTING FINANCIAL AID:
CHARTING A NEW COURSE TO COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY 171, 171–90 (Andrew P. Kelly
& Sara Goldrick-Rab eds., 2014).
72. See SHILLER, supra note 29, at 133; see also Palacios, Human Capital Con-
tracts, supra note 5, at 1, 5–6.
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formation-generating benefits of income-share financing, as the pricing of
individual income-share agreements would communicate information to
students about the institutional counterparty’s assessment of a student’s
potential and of the value of the programs or careers the student is
pursuing.73
However, the extent to which this “differential pricing” of income-
share agreements can generate useful information for students may be far
less than advocates indicate.  In order to generate information about the
value of a given program, vis-a`-vis another program, pricing would have to
control for other attributes of the student, concentrating differentials on
program differences.  Current models for income-share agreements do
not do this.  In addition, as discussed below, while many describe this dif-
ferential pricing as a “feature” of income-share agreements, it is also a sig-
nificant “bug.”74  In any event, to the extent that human capital contracts
produce useful information, the IBR Swap would do so as well.
Palacios describes information benefits of human capital contracts
this way:
The pricing of human capital contracts will be based on the
investor’s expectations of a student’s future income during the
repayment period.  Those expectations will depend on the
school that the student is attending, the student’s field of study,
and other factors considered relevant to the student’s future
earnings.  Thus, by observing the price of these contracts, com-
parisons of earnings expectations will be possible in an easy,
straightforward manner.75
There is significant outcry that such information is not currently available
to students, especially law students, and that much of the information pro-
vided is skewed or even fraudulent.76  Thus, a law-school financing mecha-
nism that could incentivize investors to spend the time and money to
collect the highest quality information available to predict probable earn-
ings of students graduating from specific schools, or based on other char-
acteristics, would be welcome by many.
IBR Swaps, in theory, would incentivize investment in information
gathering.77  The nature of that information, however, and its usefulness
73. See, e.g., Crawford & Sheets, supra note 71.
74. See infra Part IV(A).
75. Palacios, Human Capital Contracts, supra note 5, at 5.
76. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 61, at 143.
77. Price discovery is the impounding of new information into asset prices,
through trading.  In theory, the concept of price discovery can refer broadly to the
capture and aggregation of market wisdom about future events. See DON M.
CHANCE & ROBERT BROOKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES AND RISK MANAGE-
MENT 11–12 (7th ed. 2007); S.L. GUPTA, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (THEORY, CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS) 16–17, 35, 90 (2006); Joel Hasbrouck, One Security, Many Markets:
Determining the Contributions to Price Discovery, 50 J. FIN. 1175, 1175–77 (1995);
Lynch, Gambling, supra note 45, at 108–18.  Some contend that derivatives are use-
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to students would remain to be seen.  To understand how the “price” of an
IBR Swap or other income-share agreement could communicate informa-
tion to a student, it is first necessary to understand what “price” means in
this context.  Palacios explains it this way: “Let’s define the price of a
human capital contract as the percentage of income that a student agrees
to pay back to the investor per dollar provided.”78  As was discussed above,
a “breakeven price” could be identified for each student based on the
amount the counterparty will be obligated to pay each month,79 the term
of the IBR Swap, and the projected earnings of the student over the term
of the IBR Swap.  In the example described above, the counterparty paid
the student $1,726 per month ($20,712 per year), the term was ten years,
and the projected average annual earnings of the student over those ten
years was $138,080, resulting in a “price” of 15%.80
However, that 15% “price” is derived from the other variables and is
therefore not fixed.  If differential pricing were permitted, then institu-
tional counterparties might offer IBR Swaps (or other income-share agree-
ments) to different students at different prices.  For example, while one
student (Ben) might be expected to earn on average $138,080 per year,
justifying a 15% price for receiving $150,000 upfront, another student
(Heather) might be expected to earn more.  If Heather was expected to
earn $207,129, for example, she may be offered a contract with a price of
10% of her income over the same period in exchange for the same
ful to predict information, such as creditworthiness. See Mark J. Flannery, Joel F.
Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit
Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2010).  In the literature on derivatives, scholars
debate whether a robust futures market can provide beneficial “price discovery,”
focusing on the relationship between futures or options prices and spot prices in
exchange-based markets.  Some contend that the price discovery benefits of specu-
lative derivatives justify their risks (or offset the net reduction in welfare associated
with rent-seeking). See Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Price Movements
and Price Discovery in Futures and Cash Markets, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 289 (1983);
Robert W. Kolb, James V. Jordan & Gerald D. Gay, Futures Prices and Expected Future
Spot Prices, 2 REV. RES. FUTURES MARKETS 110 (1983).  Others contend that the
information that derivatives markets yield outpace spot prices by such short inter-
vals that the benefits do not offset speculative derivatives’ costs. See Lynch, Gam-
bling, supra note 45, at 116–18; Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives
Trading Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Finan-
cial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53, 55–59 (1995); Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives
by Deregulating Them, REG., Fall 2009, at 30, 31–33 [hereinafter Stout, Regulate OTC
Derivatives].  This literature may be only marginally relevant to the IBR Swap, the
“price discovery” functions of which may be quite limited.
78. See Palacios, Human Capital Contracts, supra note 5, at 5.
79. See id.
80. The price of 15% is based on the fact that the student received $150,000
up front.  However, the price should actually be expressed as a function of how
much was received.  So, for example 15% for $150,000 is really 1% for each
$10,000 received.  Therefore, if the student has some savings and so chooses only
to obtain $100,000 through a human capital contract, they will only have to pay
back 10% of their income over twenty years.
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$150,000.81  Even though they both pay for their entire education with a
human capital contract, and even though their educations cost the same
amount, Ben will have to pay back one and one-half as much as a percentage
of his future income as Heather.  The difference in price reflects the fact that
the investor predicted that Heather’s future income over the relevant pe-
riod is likely to be higher than Ben’s future income.  They will pay the
same amount as each other if they earn the amount predicted, which, if
the price is the “breakeven price,” will be the same amount that either
would pay under a traditional loan.82  If either one earns more or less
than predicted, they will pay the commensurate amount more or less ac-
cording to the “price” of their contract.
Palacios and others assume that investors would take into account
(1) school, (2) field of study, and (3) other factors when setting an appro-
priate price for a human capital contract.83  In the law school context,
investors might charge more—as a percentage of income—to a student
attending a low-ranked law school than a student attending a highly-
ranked law school, based on projected income.  If they were permitted,
investors might charge students who attended the same school less or
more depending on their Law School Admission Test (LSAT) scores or
undergraduate GPAs, if they determined that these factors were predictive
of earnings.84  Finally, if it was legal to do so, investors might charge a
student more if that student was a woman than if that student was a man,
again based on projected income, since women (including female lawyers)
earn less on average than men.85  Some may find this differential pricing
deeply disturbing, and we discuss tradeoffs in regulating differential pric-
ing below in Part V.  But it is important to recognize that there is no pro-
duction of information to students without some kind of differential
pricing.
Currently, law schools are required by the American Bar Association
(ABA) to survey their students to determine how many of them are em-
ployed nine months after graduation and what type of employment they
81. For Ben, the calculation is as follows: 20,712 ÷ 138,080 = .15; for Heather,
it is as follows: 20,712 ÷ 207,129 = .10.
82. Just to be clear, the cost of financing a law school education is likely to be
about the same under fixed debt and an income-share agreement if the student
earns the amount that they are predicted to earn.  If the student earns less than
predicted, then their cost will be higher under debt financing than under an in-
come-share agreement.  If they earn more than predicted, their cost will be higher
under an income-share agreement than under debt financing.
83. See Palacios, Human Capital Contracts, supra note 5, at 5.
84. It appears that the few companies currently purporting to offer human
capital contracts are making individualized pricing decisions based on a variety of
potentially intangible factors, given that they appear to be choosing a very few, very
promising students to receive the first contracts.  They are, in effect, “cherry pick-
ing” students. The authors know of no study that supports an inference that law
school graduates with higher LSAT scores or undergraduate GPAs make more
money than their peers, once other factors are controlled.
85. See infra Part V(A).
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have.  Some commentators have criticized this employment information as
untrustworthy, misleading, insufficient, or even fraudulent.86  An investor
in IBR Swaps would need to have much more robust information about
the earnings of those students in which they invested.  In order to “price”
the contract adequately, an investor would have to assess the long-term
earnings prospects of each participant.87  In theory, as a market for IBR
Swaps developed, investors would compete to develop the most predictive
models of future earnings, providing students with a range of opinions
about their future earning capacity.
Some believe that the information-providing benefit of differentially
priced IBR Swaps may introduce pressure on what is perceived as excessive
costs of education, especially law school education.  The extent to which
higher education costs are in fact excessive (rather than simply high),
their relationship to inflation, the rates at which they rise, and their capac-
ity to respond to downward pressure, are subjects of a rich literature.88
Though assessing cost is complex, an income-based financing program
like the IBR Swap might create some downward pressure if it provided
information to students about the relationship between cost and future
earnings that make the cost seem unjustified.89
Because the current education-financing system provides financing
on the same terms no matter what a student studies and where, and be-
cause students have such thin or misleading information about earnings
projections for graduates of various schools, commentators believe that
tuition costs are relatively insensitive to price pressures.90  In other words,
because students are unable to evaluate how much different types of edu-
cations are worth, from a financial point of view, they are prevented from
making good choices about where to go and what to study.91  In the law
school context, some commentators believe that law schools with low-earn-
86. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 61, at 143.
87. If an investor was more interested in communicating rosy information
about employment prospects of law school graduates than in making money or
breaking even, that investor could “distort” the signal provided by predictive data.
That might be a reason to favor independent investors as an institution providing a
human capital contract or IBR Swap over a law school.
88. See generally ROBERT B. ARCHIBALD & DAVID H. FELDMAN, WHY DOES COL-
LEGE COST SO MUCH? (2010); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE: WHY COM-
PUTERS GET CHEAPER AND HEALTH CARE DOESN’T (2012); WILLIAM ZUMETA ET AL.,
FINANCING AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (2012);
W.J. Baumol & W.G. Bowen, On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of Their Economic
Problems, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 495 (1965); Brooks, supra note 2, at 11–15.
89. Of course, if the effect instead shows the opposite, then the price pressure
could be upwards.
90. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 527, 557 (2013) (discussing students’ lack of information in college context).
91. See, e.g., id. at 567 (“[S]kewed incentives and information asymmetries
have increasingly shifted educational resources away from human capital invest-
ment and toward present consumption.”).
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ing graduates are unsustainably expensive.92  Students are willing to pay
the high cost of education at least partially because the structure of the
current educational financing system makes it easy to overburden oneself
with debt in programs that are unlikely to provide employment opportuni-
ties commensurate with their price.
Governmental IBR currently exacerbates this problem.  Governmen-
tal IBR is structured as a ceiling on loan repayments for students who par-
ticipate.  But this ceiling is the same no matter how much a student
borrows.  So, a student who borrows $30,000 for college will be able to
take advantage of governmental IBR only if their income is less than
$55,215.93  A student who borrows $125,000 for law school, in addition to
the $30,000 they borrowed for college, will be able to take advantage of
governmental IBR until their income exceeds $210,240.94  If they expect
their income to be below that amount, they can, in effect, continue to
borrow without their cost going up at all.  No matter how much the stu-
dent borrows, they pay a flat 10% of their income in repayment obliga-
tions.  Some commentators think this situation creates bad incentives for
students, because they have an incentive to continue attending school be-
yond when it is useful to them and also to borrow as much as permitted to
fund their educations.95  It also creates bad incentives for schools, which
can increase tuition without any additional cost to students who are al-
ready borrowing so much that they are virtually guaranteed to be covered
by governmental IBR.96
Because the percentage a graduate owes under an IBR Swap depends
on how much they borrow, the perverse incentives of governmental IBR
go away.  In other words, rather than owing a flat 10% ceiling no matter
how much a student borrows, under an IBR Swap (or other income-share
92. See, e.g., Gregory Crespi, Will the Income-Based Repayment Program Enable Law
Schools to Continue to Provide “Harvard-Style” Legal Education?, 67 SMU L. REV. 51, 60
(2014); see also TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 61, at 122–25.
93. This calculation is for the PAYE program, under which a student may limit
their monthly payments to 10% of “discretionary income,” which is defined as
150% of the DHHS Poverty Guideline for the year.  In 2014, the 150% of the Pov-
erty Guideline for a single person living in the continental United States was
$17,655.  Assuming that the student had total eligible debt of $30,000 at 4.66%
interest rate (Stafford rates for 2014), they would owe $313 per month (or $3,756
per year) under the standard (ten-year) repayment plan.  Therefore, once the stu-
dent’s income exceeded $55,215, their payments under the PAYE program would
be less than their payments under the standard program, and they would be eligi-
ble to participate in PAYE.
94. The slightly simplified math is as follows: under the standard plan, $3,756
for the undergraduate loan, plus $17,268 ($125,000 at 6.8%, see supra note 34,
under the standard ten-year payment plan) equals $21,024.  Therefore, when the
student’s income reached $227,895, the amount of discretionary income would be
$210,240 (227,895 minus 17,655), their annual payment under PAYE would be
$21,024, and so they would at that point be eligible for PAYE.
95. See DELISLE & HOLT, ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note 2, at 10 (describing
what Delisle and Holt call “zero marginal cost threshold”).
96. See id.
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agreement), the student would owe a percentage tied to the amount they
borrowed.  In that case, the cost of further borrowing always increases the
future cost of repayment, removing the perverse incentives in the current
government programs.97
B. Benefits Unique to IBR Swaps
While income-share agreements have a number of benefits, Milton
Friedman had already identified problems with them over fifty years ago.
There are two problems with human capital contracts that are not solved
by IBR Swaps: adverse selection98 and moral hazard.99  IBR Swaps, how-
ever, do largely solve the three other biggest problems associated with
human capital contracts.  First, because the institutional counterparty pro-
vides no money up front to the student, the costs of collection and risk of
default should dramatically decrease as compared to human capital con-
tracts.  Second, IBR Swaps integrate with existing government programs to
help students finance their educations, while human capital contracts
compete with such programs.  Finally, IBR Swaps are less risky for institu-
tional counterparties than human capital contracts, because there is no
need for the institutional counterparty to put significant amounts of capi-
tal at risk.  These benefits make it possible for a widespread market in
income-share agreements to become a reality for students.
1. IBR Swaps Reduce Default Risk and Collection Costs
There is an inherent collection problem in all student loans, since
such loans are unsecured.  Students do not generally have property to
serve as collateral for their loans, and therefore one of the primary mecha-
nisms for reducing risk of non-payment in large lending markets is absent
in the student loan context.  This was one of the factors that induced the
federal government to enter the student loan business in the first place.
Risk of non-payment exists in the human capital contract market as
well as in the student loan market.  Under any type of income-share agree-
ment, the investor shares some of the student’s risk of under-earning and
is compensated for this risk-sharing by distributing the risk of low earning
broadly among a pool of students.  But in addition to the risk of under-
earning by students, there is a risk that a student who has received an
upfront payment from an investor and used it for their education would
then refuse to repay the investor, even if they are able.  This risk exists
every time one person provides something of value upfront in exchange
for another promising something of value in the future.100  An investor
97. The government could also remove these perverse incentives by tying the
percentage owed under their IBR programs to the amount borrowed.
98. See infra Part IV(B).
99. For a variety of reasons we think moral hazard is not a significant problem
in the IBR Swap context. See infra notes 143–45.
100. See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite—The Dynamics of
Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1970) (“Whenever one person does something
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incurs costs when students do not pay what they owe, both because some
amount will never be collected and because monitoring the student’s
earnings and enforcing their obligation to pay has costs.
On one hand, human capital contracts may have a lower cost of col-
lection than traditional debt.  Because low-earners pay very little under the
terms of the contract, income-share agreements shift the focus of collec-
tion for non-payment from low-earning graduates (the perennial collec-
tion problem for traditional student loans) to high-earning graduates.
Low-earning graduates owe less, so they are more able to make their re-
quired payments.  High-earners, as their income goes up, have more in-
centive to try to avoid repayment.  If it is true that it is harder to collect
money from someone who has very little, focusing collection on high earn-
ers may decrease at least some collection costs.
On the other hand, costs of collection may be high for human capital
contracts, since default becomes more attractive as a student’s post-gradu-
ate income rises.  As a high earner’s income grows, they may compare the
amount they owe under a human capital contract to the amount they
would have paid under a traditional debt instrument.  As this difference
grows, the high earner might feel justified reneging on their agreement,
even if they would not have felt justified in the case of a traditional loan.
And the fact that the student is a high earner means that they may have
access to the means, like legal counsel, to press a claim to avoid
repayment.
Whether high-earning or low-earning, collection-evaders are actually
more expensive to pursue is an empirical question beyond the scope of
this Article.  It is difficult to add up these disparate and speculative costs of
collection, but they are likely substantial.  Some believe that factors like
these were instrumental in the demise of Yale’s so-called “Tuition Post-
ponement Option,” a voluntary income-based tuition program that was
available for students at Yale College from 1971 to 1978.101
The primary practical benefit of an IBR Swap over a human capital
contract is that the IBR Swap should have significantly lower costs of col-
lection across the board.  This decrease in costs of collection comes from
the fact that the institutional counterparty provides no money up front to
the student.  Rather, the student gets all the money they need for their
education from a lender, who is likely the federal government.  Therefore,
the student’s payment obligation is split between the lender and the inves-
in the expectation that another will then do something else, there arises, given the
nature of people and time, a potential problem: the other person might not.”).
101. Robert Shiller has an informative description of the program, in which
he concluded that it “was a wonderful idea, but it . . . [among other things] af-
fronted then-current individual impressions of fairness.” SHILLER, supra note 29, at
143.
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tor.  This bifurcation of payment obligation reduces the cost of collection
for the investor.102
As discussed above, the student has an obligation to pay a fixed
amount to the lender no matter how much they earn.  They and the insti-
tutional counterparty then make reciprocal payments that are either ex-
actly equal, result in a net positive for the student, or result in a net
positive for the institutional counterparty.  Remember, the amount of in-
come the student earns at which the reciprocal payments are exactly equal
is called the break-even point.
If the student earns less than the break-even point, then they are re-
ceiving more from the institutional counterparty than they are paying it.
In that situation, obviously, the student has a strong incentive to perform.
Every time the reciprocal payments do not occur, they lose money.  So, if
the reciprocal payments only occur when the student both reports infor-
mation to the institutional counterparty and makes the appropriate pay-
ment to the institutional counterparty, then the institutional
counterparty’s costs of collection should be quite low.  The counterparty
presumably never needs to chase down low-earning students or expend
significant sums to monitor them.  It does have to make sure it has a sys-
tem in place to keep track of which students have made payments to it, so
it does not make payments to students who have not made their appropri-
ate reciprocal payments.  It also needs some system to ensure that students
are not providing false or fraudulent information about their income,
since a student’s reported income determines the amount of money the
student pays the institutional counterparty.103  But the counterparty has a
pretty big stick that it can swing: each month it pays the student more than
the student pays it.
This situation is dramatically different from a human capital contract,
in which the investor provides a bulk payment up front.  Once the student
receives the upfront capital and spends it on tuition, the entire obligation
flows the other way, from student to investor.  Therefore, it is in the stu-
dent’s interest to avoid payment or even disappear if possible, even if their
income is below what would be the break-even amount in an IBR Swap.
The only “sticks” the institutional investor wields are the enforcement pro-
visions that lenders use to enforce unsecured debts.104  Since in the case
of an IBR Swap the institutional counterparty has provided nothing up
102. Note that the total cost of collection shared between the investor and the
lender may be the same or even greater than the cost of collection associated with
a human capital contract.  We focus on the cost of collection for the investor
alone, who is able to “piggy back” on the collection efforts of the lender and
thereby save money.
103. There is a wide range of contractual options available to enforce pay-
ment and income-monitoring, including required submission of student’s federal
income tax forms and required information sharing from student loan lenders.
104. In this context, legal uncertainty about whether human capital contracts
constitute debt or are dischargeable in bankruptcy becomes important. See infra
Part IV(C) & (D).
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front, the student depends on it to make ongoing monthly payments.  It is
in the student’s interest to maintain the relationship and provide what is
needed to receive those ongoing reciprocal payments.
When students earn more than the break-even amount, the situation
is reversed, and it is in the student’s interest to avoid payment.  But, as
compared to a human capital contract, an institutional counterparty pro-
viding an IBR Swap is in much better shape.  That is because the amount
owed to the IBR Swap institutional counterparty is a fraction of the
amount that would be owed to a human capital contract investor, as the
student’s total payment obligation is split between the student’s lender
and the swap counterparty.
Take as an example the student described above who earns $160,000.
The student owes $1,726 per month on law school loans.  The student also
has a reciprocal obligation under which they pay the institutional
counterparty $2,000, and it pays them $1,726, which represents a net pay-
ment from the student to the institutional counterparty of $274.  If the
student stops paying the IBR Swap institutional counterparty the $2,000
they owe, the institutional counterparty will stop paying the student the
$1,726 it owes them.105  This default results in a monthly benefit to the
student of only $274, while their monthly benefit would be the full $2,000
if they defaulted on a human capital contract with the same terms.
If the student wants to avoid payment altogether, they have to default
not only on their payments under the IBR Swap, but also to their lender.
Obviously, if the benefit of defaulting on the student’s obligation to the
institutional counterparty alone is only $274 instead of $2,000 per month,
their incentive to default is lower.  If they choose to default on their entire
obligation—$274 to the institutional counterparty and $1,726 to the
lender—then they will have both the lender and the institutional
counterparty seeking to enforce the obligation.  In that case, presumably,
there would be at least some collection synergies that would reduce the
cost of collection for the institutional counterparty.  And if they both fail,
the institutional counterparty will only lose $274 per month.  The lender
takes the bigger loss from the default.
In addition, the fact that a student’s income is likely to go up over the
course of their post-graduate career means that they are likely to have
105. Reciprocal payments could be reduced to a single net payment.  Under
this system, the payment obligation of the student counterparty would be netted
against the payment obligation of the institutional counterparty; one counterparty
would make a net payment.  If the institutional counterparty owed the student
$1,726, and the student owed the institutional counterparty $2,000, there would be
a single payment of $274 from the student to the institutional counterparty.  In
another alternative, the institutional counterparty could make its full payment di-
rectly to the student’s lender and collect the full amount the student owes directly.
Under this scenario, the institutional counterparty would ensure that the student
was not defaulting on its loan and keeping the institutional counterparty’s pay-
ments, but the institutional counterparty would be required to collect the whole
amount from the student.
25
Leff and Hughes: Student Loan Derivatives: Improving on Income-Based Approaches to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
124 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 99
started their career receiving a net benefit from the institutional
counterparty.  In that case, they may have developed a personal “culture of
compliance,” in which they have gotten into the habit of making their
payments to the institutional counterparty, and this culture of compliance
may raise the personal, psychic costs of defaulting for the student.  In any
case, while collection costs do not disappear in an IBR Swap, limiting col-
lection problems to high-earning students, and even decreasing them sub-
stantially, should dramatically decrease collection costs.
But more importantly, the fact that IBR Swaps coordinate with gov-
ernmental loan programs means that the government is still collecting a
significant portion of the student’s repayment obligation.  The govern-
ment can use collection mechanisms that are superior to those available to
ordinary lenders or human capital contract providers.  It currently ad-
ministers $1 trillion of student loans,106 and thus economies of scale drive
down costs of collection.  In addition, once a student has defaulted, the
government has the ability to withhold tax refunds, garnish paychecks,
and take a portion of social security benefits—all without a court order.107
It also has made student loans non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.108  If
human capital contracts were entered into with private investors, none of
the collection benefits of governmental student loans would apply.  The
private parties would be left to their own devices to enforce collection, and
these costs could represent a significant cost per agreement, driving up
the price.  In the case of an IBR Swap, however, because the payment obli-
gation is split between the government lender and the IBR provider, the
collection methods available to the government are not lost, but can be
used to collect a portion of the student’s repayment obligation.
2. IBR Swaps Coordinate with Government Student-Loan Programs
Unlike human capital contracts, the IBR Swap complements, rather
than competes with, existing governmental student loan programs.  The
benefit of this coordination is apparent in reducing collection costs, but it
also has additional benefits.  Under current law, the federal government
provides loans to students for attending law school at a fixed rate.  There is
some controversy currently about whether the rate is too high, but it is
inarguably lower than could be obtained from private lenders.  Because
the federal government still provides the upfront capital (in the form of a
student loan) for a student’s education when the student enters an IBR
Swap, the student can benefit from this favorable interest rate.
106. See Rohit Chopra, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 17, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance
.gov/newsroom/student-debt-swells-federal-loans-now-top-a-trillion/ [https://per
ma.cc/manage/create/].
107. See Federal Loans, STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE, http://www
.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/collections/federal-loans/ [https://perma
.cc/TPA5-HDQW] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
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Human capital contracts, on the other hand, compete with federal
student loans.  A student who wishes to enter into a human capital con-
tract must forego student loans in favor of the contract.109  Therefore, any
subsidies that are provided by the federal government to the student loan
industry by guaranteeing or directly offering student loans cannot be used
by students who obtain their financing through human capital contracts.
In addition, any loan-forgiveness programs offered or subsidized by the
government will not be available to human capital contract holders.  In
this way, human capital contracts must not only provide terms that are
more attractive than those offered by traditional lenders, they must offer
terms that are more attractive than those offered by the government.
IBR Swaps are designed specifically to be used in conjunction with
federal student loan programs, and so any subsidy available through the
federal student loan system is also available to students with IBR Swaps.  If
the government should ever increase the subsidies provided through the
student loan system, this would negatively impact a market for human cap-
ital contracts.  IBR Swaps, on the other hand, act in the opposite way.
They complement governmental loan programs and automatically inte-
grate any benefits provided by government loans into themselves.  The
price of an IBR Swap is directly tied to the amount a student needs to pay
back their loans, and it therefore automatically incorporates any subsidies
or benefits provided by the government into the Swap.  If the government
loan rate goes down, then the amount of reciprocal payments a student
needs to cover their loan payments goes down, and the price of an IBR
Swap would also go down.110
This Article does not assess how the IBR Swap would or should inter-
act with government income-based repayment programs.  That question is
a complex one, and the objective here is to present the basic IBR Swap
concept.  For example, understanding how an IBR Swap program would
interface with a government income-based repayment program would re-
quire discussion of which counterparty should capture benefits of the gov-
ernment subsidy.  Also, the mechanics of how the Swap would interact
109. Students are presumably not required to completely forego student
loans, but each dollar they acquire under a human capital contract is a dollar they
do not acquire through a student loan.
110. If the government changes the repayment rate on loans that have al-
ready been disbursed, the IBR “price” has already been fixed, and so the student’s
obligation to the institutional counterparty would presumably not change.  But in
this case, the student still automatically receives the benefit of a reduced student-
loan repayment obligation, because the reciprocal payment from the institutional
counterparty to the student would be more than the student needs to repay their
loans.  Absent any contractual provision to the contrary, they could keep the differ-
ence, or it would be incorporated into the calculation of the single net payment
made from the student to the institutional counterparty or from the institutional
counterparty to the student.
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with a student election of government-sponsored, income-based payments
would require explication.111
3. IBR Swaps Do Not Put Capital at Risk
Finally, IBR Swap institutional counterparties avoid a part of the costs
associated with providing upfront capital to invest in a student’s educa-
tion.  Under an IBR Swap, the student borrows the upfront capital from a
lender, and accordingly the IBR Swap institutional counterparty does not
have to take on the cost of such capital.  Of course, the capital still has a
cost, which is the interest rate the student owes the lender, and the IBR
Swap must be priced to compensate the student for the cost of capital the
student obtained through a traditional loan.  But the institutional
counterparty does not have to take on much additional debt of its own.112
Again, a human capital contract does not have this feature.  A pro-
vider of human capital contracts has to invest significant capital up-front
on the promise of repayment in future years.  Because providers of human
capital contracts must provide capital upfront to students, because they
won’t receive it back for many years, and because they are likely to receive
less of it back in the early stages of the contract, providers of human capi-
tal contracts have the costs associated with acquiring the capital to provide
to students.
111. One possibility would be for the institutional counterparty’s obligations
to be unaffected by a student’s participation in a governmental IBR program and
all the benefit to be received by the student.  So, if a student had an IBR Swap
under which the student paid the institutional counterparty 10% of their income
in exchange for the counterparty’s payment of $1,726 per month, both parties
payments would remain the same whether the student made use of a governmental
IBR program or not.  If the student’s income was $50,000, they would pay the
institutional counterparty $417 per month (10% of their income), and the institu-
tional counterparty would pay the student $1,726 per month—enough to make
the payments on their student loan.  But the student would also qualify to make
payments on their loan of $417 per month (slightly simplified math) under a gov-
ernmental IBR program, and if the student chose to take advantage of it, they
could use the $1,726 they received from the institutional counterparty to pay the
government $417, and still have $1,309 in their pocket.  Of course, the other possi-
bility would be for the institutional counterparty to receive the benefit of the gov-
ernment IBR program.  In either case, the chance of the benefit would be
incorporated into the “price” of the IBR Swap, decreasing the overall price the
student pays if the benefit were to be captured by the institutional counterparty.
Of course, whichever party was contractually permitted to capture the benefit of
government IBR would, in effect, be bearing the risk that the government will
discontinue or change its IBR programs.
112. The institutional counterparty will probably have to take on some debt,
since it is predictable that students’ earnings will be lower in the earlier part of
their careers than the latter parts, and therefore the IBR Swap institutional
counterparty will have to borrow money to pay out more than it is receiving in the
first several years.
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IV. CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
The practical benefits unique to IBR Swaps discussed above are not
the only benefits that make the IBR Swap superior to other income-share
arrangements.  IBR Swaps, because they are a recognizable financial in-
strument, do not face as much legal uncertainty as human capital con-
tracts face under current law.
Proponents of human capital contracts have argued that legal uncer-
tainty is a significant impediment to the development of a market for
human capital contracts.113  That uncertainty arises primarily from the
fact that a human capital contract is not a preexisting (and therefore rec-
ognizable) category of financial instrument.  Is it an “equity investment in
human beings,” as Milton Friedman suggested over half a decade ago?114
Is it a form of debt?  Is it a kind of insurance?  Is it a partnership or joint
venture between the student and the contract provider?115  In order to
know what law would apply to a human capital contract, one needs an
answer to these questions.  To remove some of this uncertainty, Senator
Marco Rubio and Representative Tom Petri introduced legislation to clar-
ify the legal treatment of income-share agreements in 2014, and in 2015,
Representatives Todd Young and Jared Polis introduced similar
legislation.116
For IBR Swaps, the legal and regulatory landscape is quite different
from that of other income-share agreements like human capital contracts.
The design of IBR Swaps makes the question of how they would be regu-
lated under existing law much easier to answer.  Because they are a preex-
isting category of financial instruments—a derivative—there is no
question about whether they are an “equity investment in a human being.”
They are not.  Just like other swap transactions, the agreement is legally
113. See, e.g., PALACIOS ET AL., INVESTING IN VALUE, SHARING RISK, supra note
24, at 12 (“Significant legal uncertainty exists regarding the treatment of [human
capital contracts]. . . . this legal uncertainty has made it very difficult for any kind
of market to develop on a larger scale. . . .  A major impediment to the growth of
[a human capital contract] industry is regulatory uncertainty: not only are some of
the rules uncertain, but even the source of any future rules is also uncertain . . . .
[I]s [a human capital contract] more like a loan, an investment contract, or a
hedging instrument?”); see also Jacobs & van Wijnbergen, supra note 16, at 5 (not-
ing “legal problems prevent the execution of both equity and insurance contracts
by the private sector in the case of education financing,” then listing as causes
“contract enforceability,” illegality of “slavery and indentured labor,” which makes
it illegal “to sell claims on future incomes,” and “bankruptcy laws” not covering
equity-like financing); id. (“These legal limitations effectively preclude financial
contracts that are contingent upon the returns of human-capital investment.”); id.
at 6 (“[G]iven the legal limitations, private contracts are currently prohibitively
costly to execute.  Attempting to eliminate legal limitations to facilitate trade in
equity-type contracts requires far-reaching changes in the legal system that are also
very costly.”).
114. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 140.
115. See Oei & Ring, Human Equity?, supra note 24, at 723–25.
116. See H.R. 3432, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2014).
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enforceable.117  Because nothing of value is provided upfront to the stu-
dent in exchange for a future promise of repayment, they are not debt,
and are therefore not subject to fair lending laws or laws that apply specifi-
cally to student loans.118  For the same reason, they are not “securities”
subject to securities regulation; the investor makes no disbursement in ex-
change for a speculative return.119  As discussed below, they are not insur-
ance under current law.  Even their treatment in bankruptcy120 and how
they would be taxed121 is more certain than human capital contracts.
But the fact that regulatory treatment of IBR Swaps is relatively cer-
tain under existing law does not mean that such treatment is right, from a
normative perspective.  Recently, scholars have begun to examine what
117. Jacobs & van Wijnbergen, supra note 16, at 5 (“[I]n general, contract
enforceability of private equity contracts is problematic because legal frameworks
are not yet adapted to protecting the rights of investors who provide the funds for
the investment.”).
118. Id. at 12; see also PALACIOS ET AL., INVESTING IN VALUE, SHARING RISK, supra
note 24, at 12 (“[P]olicymakers should make clear that the total cost of [a human
capital contract] should not be used retrospectively to impute an interest rate for
usury purposes . . . .”).
119. The income-share obligation of the student counterparty is not a secur-
ity, nor is the IBR Swap transaction itself.  Legal scholars have analyzed whether
human capital contracts are securities for regulatory purposes, focusing on the
possibility that investing in a person, taking an “equity” interest in future earnings,
could fall within the catchall category of “investment contract” for SEC purposes.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012); id. § 78c(a)(1).  In order to be an investment
contract, a transaction must involve (1) investment of money, (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) to earn a profit, (4) solely from the effort of others. See Schwartz,
supra note 24, at 1156–63. In an IBR Swap, the institutional counterparty does not
make an investment of money in the student.  The IBR Swap involves a contractual
commitment to pay a loan obligation in exchange for payment of a share of in-
come.  There is not an investment or disbursement on which the institution seeks a
return.  If the student fails to remit income, the institution ceases to make loan
payments.  The payments are simultaneous.  The IBR Swap itself is also not a secur-
ity.  See Securities Act of 1933 § 2A, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (providing definition of
security does not include non-security-based swap agreement as defined in section
206C of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).  The IBR Swap would not be a securities-based
swap. See Final Rules and Interpretations i) Further Defining “Swap,” “Security-Based
Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; ii) Regarding “Mixed Swaps”; and iii) Gov-
erning Books and Records for “Security-Based Swap Agreements, U.S. COMMODITIES & FU-
TURES TRADING COMM’N, available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/
@newsroom/documents/file/fd_factsheet_final.pdf [perma.cc/NAW7-J24C] (last
visited Feb. 27, 2016); see also Jacobs & van Wijnbergen, supra note 16, at 5 (“Since
human-capital contracts are not legally acknowledged as securities, trade in claims
on human capital is legally obstructed.”).
120. PALACIOS ET AL., INVESTING IN VALUE, SHARING RISK, supra note 24, at 13;
see also Jacobs & van Wijnbergen, supra note 16, at 5 (“[B]ankruptcy laws do not
generally feature provisions for graduates who declare themselves bankrupt to
avoid dividend payments to financiers, whereas bankruptcy laws do cover provi-
sions for debt contracts.”  (citation omitted) (citing Palacios, Human Capital Con-
tracts, supra note 5)).
121. PALACIOS ET AL., INVESTING IN VALUE, SHARING RISK, supra note 24, at 14
(“[P]articipants face some uncertainty regarding tax treatment of payments
[under a human capital contract] . . . .”).
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rules should apply to income-share agreements like human capital con-
tracts.122  Since IBR Swaps are different from other human capital con-
tracts in critical ways, we address regulatory questions and opportunities
raised by IBR Swaps.
A. Swaps: Federal Derivatives Regulation and State Insurance Laws
Two different regulatory regimes may pertain to a contract involving
transfer of loan default risk in exchange for a speculative return: deriva-
tives regulation and insurance regulation.123  Subsection 1 below explains
that an IBR Swap would not be subject to federal regulations pertaining to
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.124  The IBR Swap, though, serves an
“insurance” or hedging function for the student counterparty.125  Subsec-
tion 2 discusses the extent to which IBR Swaps could, in theory, fall within
the ambit of state insurance regulation.  It considers the purpose and de-
sign of insurance regulation, the identities of IBR Swap counterparties,
and the fitness of state insurance regulators (as opposed to other in-
termediaries), for addressing regulatory concerns that the IBR Swap could
raise.  This Subsection argues that the IBR Swap should not be subject to
state insurance regulation.  However, it identifies the possibility that a reg-
ulator could claim that an IBR Swap program falls within its jurisdiction.
1. Federal Derivatives Regulation
Simply put, the IBR Swap as presented above would be exempt from
federal regulations pertaining to OTC derivatives.126  Derivatives regula-
tion centers on clearinghouse requirements—rules requiring that certain
swaps are confined to a derivatives clearing organization registered with
122. See Oei & Ring, Human Equity?, supra note 24, at 729–36; Schwartz, supra
note 24, at 1165–74.
123. As mentioned above, the IBR Swap would not be a security. See supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
125. There are insurance policies designed to cover risk of inability to meet
loan obligations.  These kinds of policies, however, tend to have a maximum cover-
age of twenty-four months and are designed to cover loan payments upon occur-
rence of some event, such as unemployment, that temporarily affects the insured’s
ability to pay.  In addition to policies especially for payment protection, other in-
surance policies and workplace benefit plans can cover temporary inability to pay
loans, such as disability or unemployment benefits. See Ana Gonzalez Ribeiro, Is
Loan Protection Insurance Right for You?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia
.com/articles/pf/08/loan-protection-insurance.asp [https://perma.cc/5B64-
ESQL] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  The IBR Swap offers a very different kind of
hedging arrangement, obviously, than insurance policies that protect borrowers
for a limited time if they cannot pay.
126. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the Commodities Exchange Act
(CEA) to require that OTC derivatives trade through clearinghouses, but provides
exceptions. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act) § 723, 7  U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Commodities and Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 2(h)1, 2(h)7.
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the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).127  However, OTC
derivatives in which one counterparty is not a financial entity—like the
IBR Swap—are exempt from clearinghouse requirements.128  Derivatives
in which one counterparty is hedging or mitigating commercial risks are
also exempt.129  Because student counterparties would meet the end-user
exception for non-financial entities, we need not assess whether student
counterparties to IBR Swaps would be mitigating “commercial risks” as de-
fined by the CFTC.
Clearinghouses serve enforcement functions that mitigate risks and
market effects of counterparty defaults.130  Though IBR Swaps would not
be regulated derivatives, it may be interesting to consider whether IBR
Swap programs might want to use a private clearinghouse system.131
2. State Insurance Laws
Insurance regulation is a state enterprise that primarily addresses con-
sumer protection concerns.132  However, Dodd-Frank does create federal
regulatory oversight for “systemically important” insurers, which addresses
the systemic risk associated with failure of the largest insurers, such as
AIG.133  Whether an IBR Swap program would fall within the ambit of
insurance regulation depends upon factors such as the nature of the insti-
tutional counterparty and the existence of intermediaries (such as schools
or a private clearinghouse) that can protect the interests of student
counterparties.134  Robust discussion has surrounded the question of
127. Id. §§ 2(h)(1), 2(h)(7).
128. Dodd-Frank Act § 723; see also CFTC End-User Exception to the Clearing Re-
quirement for Swaps Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 39.1 (2016).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 39.6(a)(i).
130. See Stout, Derivatives, supra note 54, at 34–35.
131. See generally Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
1641 (2013) (describing clearinghouse system and questioning its efficacy in finan-
cial regulation).
132. See McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012) (stat-
ing that regulation of insurance by states is in public interest and that no federal
law of general applicability shall preempt state laws regulating business of insur-
ance); Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1579–84 (2014). See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM &
DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 2–5 (6th ed. 2015); THE FU-
TURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Martin F. Grace & Robert
W. Klein eds., 2009); John Patrick Hunt, Rating Dependent Regulation of Insurance, 17
CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (2010); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-
Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 13 (1993); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory
Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 625 (1999).
133. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 132, at 1589–93; Daniel Schwarcz,
Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?: Against Regulatory Competi-
tion in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1770–71 (2010); see also Hunt, supra note
132; Manns, supra note 45.
134. Substantively, insurance laws establish (1) licensing requirements for in-
surers, (2) fiduciary duties to policy holders, (3) capital reserves, (4) disclosure of
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whether derivatives should be regulated as insurance.135  In order for a
contract to be “insurance,” the protection buyer must have an insurable
interest—a property interest or other risk of real loss that the contract
covers.136
An IBR Swap would fall within the class of derivatives in which a hedg-
ing counterparty has an insurable interest.  The student counterparty is in
privity of contract with law school lenders and, by entering into the Swap,
is hedging risk of default on those loans.  Because of this, state regulators
could claim that IBR Swaps are subject to insurance laws.  Despite this
possibility, however, IBR Swaps do not necessarily raise the concerns that
insurance regulation is designed to address.  This Subsection now presents
these concerns, discussing the extent to which IBR Swaps implicate them.
While the major, overarching concern of insurance law is consumer
protection, the need for consumer protection stems from two different
sources.  The first is lack of sophistication among consumers and consum-
ers’ general vulnerability in procuring essential insurance products.  The
second is solvency risk due to the nature of insurance firms, namely, the
facts that (1) they have an inverted production cycle that detaches con-
tracting and pricing from customers’ receipt of the product137 (payment
on claims which may happen years later or never) and (2) they have dif-
fuse creditors, or policyholders, that do not assert control to discourage
excessively risky decision-making when firms encounter distress.138
insurers’ financial data to regulators, (5) approval of form contracts, and (6) re-
strictions on prices that insurers can charge consumers.  Henderson, supra note 53,
at 42–48.
135. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activi-
ties: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 375 (2005); Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It is
Time to Regulate Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 123 (2009) [here-
inafter Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap]; Henderson, supra note 53; Stout, Regulate
OTC Derivatives, supra note 77; see also Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in
the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agric. Comm., 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Eric Dinallo, Superintendent, Ins. Dep’t, N.Y.), available at http://
agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h91120/Dinallo.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6MFD-N3S5].
136. The insurable interest doctrine can be complex; scholars and policy-
makers debate what constitutes an insurable interest for purposes of insurance
laws’ jurisdiction. See Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap, supra note 135, at 420–26;
Michael J. Henke, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Meets the Texas Insurable Interest Re-
quirement: A Train Wreck in Progress, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 53–54 (2003) (discussing
Texas’s “insurable interest” doctrine); Hunt, supra note 133; Roy Kreitner, Specula-
tions of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1099–1100 (2000); see also GRAYDON S. STARING, LAW OF REIN-
SURANCE § 6:1 (1993) (“In limited space we can talk around insurable interest but
never talk it through.  A standard text confesses that ‘[i]t is very difficult to give any
definition of an insurable interest,’ and then discusses it for about 70 pages” (alter-
ation in original) (quoting 1 M. MUSTILL & J. GILMAN, ARNOULD ON THE LAW OF
MARINE INSURANCE AND AVERAGE §§ 331–410 (16th ed. 1981))).
137. See Henderson, supra note 53; Hunt, supra note 132.
138. Id.
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With respect to consumer vulnerability, an IBR Swap program would
not necessarily raise the same concerns as insurance products.  Law stu-
dents are a specific class of consumer, and participation in the program
would not be mandatory.  This is not to say that student counterparties
need no protection, are sophisticated, or enjoy even bargaining positions
with institutional counterparties.  It is only to say that regulation of such
interactions in the IBR Swap context may raise issues different from those
that arise in various insurance markets and so-tailored regulation may be
appropriate.  For example, intermediaries such as school advisors and fi-
nancial aid office professionals may be in a better position to protect stu-
dents’ interests than state insurance regulators.  Protection of the
“protection buyer”—the student counterparty to an IBR Swap—involves
both explanation of the programs’ terms and conditions and also protec-
tion from unfair pricing.  Private intermediaries familiar with legal educa-
tion, law school graduates’ career trajectories, and federal lending
programs would likely be better suited than state officials to advise protec-
tion buyers in the IBR Swap context.
Regulatory concerns that stem from dangerous incentives of an in-
verted production cycle would most likely not arise in an IBR Swap pro-
gram.  Unlike other businesses, insurance firms contract with customers
who pay in the form of premiums in advance of product delivery—pay-
ment on claims which may happen years later or not at all.  Because of
this, insurance firms lack the discipline that comes with having to spend
revenues on market products and services deliverable contemporaneously
with customer contracts.139  Insurance firms can fall into a model that is
not unlike a Ponzi scheme, where they solicit investment from new cus-
tomers, using that revenue to pay claims to prior customers because they
lost revenues from prior customers on risky investments.140  Insurance
regulation imposes capital requirements and financial disclosure require-
ments on insurance firms to avoid this result.141
An IBR Swap program would not have the inverted production cycle
associated with insurance firms.  The institutional counterparty begins pay-
ing on the student counterparty’s obligations to law school lenders as soon
as they become due.  The institutional counterparty’s performance obliga-
tion is certain in amount and contemporaneous with the student
counterparty’s payments.  Furthermore, incomes generally rise over time,
both because of the effects of inflation on wages and because more exper-
ienced lawyers tend to earn more than less experienced ones.  Because of
the likelihood that early earnings would be lower than later earnings, the
institutional counterparty is likely to owe more than it collects in the early
years of each contract and overall.  Thus, it will need some source of capi-
tal at the outset, but its need to accumulate capital is the inverse of the
139. See Henderson, supra note 53.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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production cycle that is dominant in the insurance industry, in which the
insurer collects money over time and is required to pay out later because
of an insured event.
With respect to concerns arising from the capital and governance
structure of insurance firms, the extent to which an IBR Swap program
would raise these concerns depends upon the identity of the institutional
counterparty.  In other kinds of firms, capitalization often comes from a
large number of diffuse shareholders, along with a small group of credi-
tors, banks, or other lenders, with monitoring capacity.  When the firm
faces distress, creditors often can exercise monitoring and control func-
tions through loan covenants, other contractual obligations, and collateral
obligations, preventing excessively risky behavior.142  An insurance firm,
however, has a diffuse group of   creditors—policyholders—who are not in
a position to monitor and exert control like institutional creditors do.
This leaves insurance firms more prone than other businesses to excessive
risk-taking in hard times.  Again, capital adequacy, disclosures, and other
risk protections imposed by insurance laws address this risk.
Counterparties to derivatives are often financial institutions that do
not share the same governance and capital structure as insurance firms.  If
the institutional counterparty to an IBR Swap were such a financial institu-
tion, then the state insurance law requirements designed to address these
concerns would not be necessary.  Many swap counterparties are also not
exclusively in the business of entering into one kind of swap.  They are
firms with multiple kinds of investments, speculative, and hedging posi-
tions across product types and even industries.  It is possible that the insti-
tutional counterparty to an IBR Swap could be an entity dedicated to
entering into these swaps with a pool of student counterparties and a capi-
tal structure analogous to that of an insurance firm.  If this were the case,
then some regulatory requirements to control excessive risk-taking in the
event that the pool of swaps leans towards negative value would be
desirable.
It is not clear, though, that state insurance regulation would be the
best mechanism to protect student counterparties in this situation.  Often,
clearinghouse requirements address counterparty risk and capital ade-
quacy concerns in the derivatives context.  A private clearinghouse for IBR
Swaps could be a better solution to counterparty risk for students than
subjecting the IBR Swap program to state insurance regulation.  However,
clearinghouse requirements could raise the transaction costs of IBR
Swaps, making the Swaps less advantageous for students.  Given this con-
142. There is ample literature on the efficacy of creditors’ monitoring func-
tions. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 901 (1986); Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung & Albert H. Yoon, What Else
Matters for Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991
(2008); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Boardroom: The Unsung Influence of Private
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009).  This simple explana-
tion is just to compare typical insurers to possible IBR Swap counterparties.
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cern, regulators might require institutional counterparties to have diversi-
fied portfolios, and perhaps subject them to other capital adequacy
requirements as regulated banking institutions.
In conclusion, the IBR Swap should not be subject to state insurance
regulation.  IBR Swaps do not raise the same concerns for protection sell-
ers and buyers that insurance policies and firms do.  Additionally, to the
extent that IBR Swaps do warrant protection for student counterparties or
attention to the nature of institutional counterparties, private in-
termediaries would be better suited to address concerns than state insur-
ance regulators would be.  That said, the IBR Swap does involve hedging
of risk by a student-counterparty with an insurable interest.  As such, a
state insurance regulator could potentially claim that IBR Swaps fall within
insurance regulators’ jurisdiction.
To the extent that the IBR Swap serves an insurance function for the
student counterparty, some may wonder if moral hazard among student
counterparties could undermine the efficacy of an IBR Swap program.
Moral hazard is often identified as a central problem with insurance prod-
ucts.143  Moral hazard “is a form of ex post opportunism” that arises in
insurance markets when the existence of insurance reduces the insured’s
incentives to avoid the insured loss.144  In the case of human capital con-
tracts, some commentators fear that owing a percentage of one’s income
to investors might decrease a person’s incentives to earn income.  The ex-
istence of moral hazard in this context is an empirical question, and availa-
ble evidence suggests that we should not be overly concerned about it.145
143. See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 29, at 113.  For livelihood insurance, Shiller
proposes that individual livelihood insurance only cover 50% of the decline in
income “since the person is only reimbursed for half of his or her own income
drop, he or she still has an incentive to work hard, reducing, if not eliminating, the
moral hazard problem.” Id.  If the insurance only covers 15% of a student’s in-
come, the moral hazard problem is presumably even less.
144. FRANCESCO PARISI, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: A DICTIONARY
187, 188 (2013); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
50–52 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that moral hazard arises when behavior of insuree
changes after purchase of insurance so that probability of loss or size of loss
increases).
145. Scholars have been interested in the question of how paying a percent-
age of one’s income affects labor participation for decades.  That is because the
income tax functions just like a human capital contract in that each dollar a tax-
payer earns is reduced by a percentage that is paid to a third party.  It is axiomatic
that the disincentives for labor participation that an income tax produces are a
significant potential flaw in any income tax regime.  However, the empirical evi-
dence suggests that relatively low income tax rates have modest effects on labor
participation. See, e.g., Robert McClelland & Shannon Mok, A Review of Recent Re-
search on Labor Supply Elasticities (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 2012-12,
2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
10-25-2012-Recent_Research_on_Labor_Supply_Elasticities.pdf [https://perma
.cc/AA6L-WZ3U].
Also, a market for human capital contracts or IBR Swaps might reduce a vari-
ety of moral hazard problems that exist in the current student debt regime.  For
example, some commentators have decried the moral hazard that arises when law
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B. Enforceability of the Contract
Commentators have expressed concern that a human capital contract
might not be enforceable.146  If human capital contracts are unenforce-
able, then a student would be permitted under the law to walk away from
these agreements without sanction.  The drafters of the proposed legisla-
tion regarding income-share agreements thought enforceability was
enough of an issue that they included a section that stated: “Any income
share agreement that complies with the requirements of [this law] shall be
a valid, binding, and enforceable contract notwithstanding any State law
limiting or otherwise regulating assignments of future wages or other in-
come.”147 The history of wage assignments and legal restrictions on them
is long, and while no one has made a strong case that human capital con-
tracts would be unenforceable under current law in any state, some legal
uncertainty presumably remains.
But whatever uncertainty surrounds the enforceability of human capi-
tal contracts; it does not affect IBR Swaps.148  An IBR Swap does not in-
volve any sort of assignment of wages; it is simply a derivative that uses
future earnings to measure the payment obligation of one of the
counterparties.  The institutional counterparty has no claim directly
against the student’s employer.  There is no wage garnishment.149  The
institutional counterparty cannot demand specific performance.  The
Swap is not an unenforceable wager150 because, as discussed above, the
schools can charge unsustainably high tuition and the students can avoid paying
back their loans by making use of current federal income-based repayment and
loan forgiveness programs. See, e.g., Steven J. Harper, Bankruptcy and Bad Behavior
the Real Moral Hazard: Law Schools Exploiting Market Dysfunction, 23 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 347 (2015).
146. The most extreme claim is that human capital contracts may be illegal or
unconstitutional as a form of slavery, indentured servitude, or peonage.  Jeff
Schwartz, for example, argues that an exchange of money for future income is
“equity in a person” and therefore a form of “ownership in people,” and so, it
could be argued that “they should be outlawed on constitutional or policy
grounds.” See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1121.  He ultimately concludes, however,
“human-equity investing passes [constitutional] muster.” See id. at 1122, 1135–38;
see also  Jacobs & van Wijnbergen, supra note 16, at 5.  Some commentators make
vague statements about the enforceability of human capital contracts if students
choose to breach. See, e.g., Jacobs & van Wijnbergen, supra note 16, at 5 (“It is not
generally possible to sell claims on future incomes.  For example, some states in
the U.S. do not allow this.” (citation omitted) (citing Palacios, Human Capital Con-
tracts, supra note 5)); see also supra note 117.
147. H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. § 101(b) (2d Sess. 2014).
148. For discussion of enforceability of a “settlement amount” in case of
breach, see supra note 58.
149. Although, if there was, some states would require the term to be shorter
than the likely term of an IBR Swap. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV.,
FACT SHEET #30: THE FEDERAL WAGE GARNISHMENT LAW, CONSUMER CREDIT PRO-
TECTION ACT’S TITLE 3 (CCPA) (rev. July 2009), available at http:www.dol.gov/
whd/regs/compliance/whdfs30.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR4H-6YFR].
150. At common law, wagering agreements were unenforceable. See Stout,
Derivatives, supra note 54, at 1.  However, a derivative like a swap agreement is not
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student counterparty is hedging risk pertaining to an insurable interest.151
In short, an IBR Swap is a fully enforceable contract under current law.
C. Debt Treatment
Proponents of human capital contracts also worry that such agree-
ments could be classified as “debt,” which would make compliance with a
variety of laws difficult at best.  For example, if human capital contracts
constituted debt or a “private education loan” they might be regulated
under the Truth in Lending Act of 1968.152  These federal laws require
lenders to clearly disclose interest charges as an annual rate.  But for a
human capital contract, calculating such a rate is impossible because the
amount the “borrower” is obligated to repay to the “lender” varies depend-
ing on the income of the borrower.
Furthermore, if human capital contracts are loans, they might be sub-
ject not only to the disclosure requirements, but also to limits on the maxi-
mum amount that could be charged.153  Many states have limits on the
total amount of interest that can be charged to a borrower, and these lim-
its, if applicable, would mandate relatively low ceilings on the maximum
amount a high earner could pay under a human capital contract.  If these
limits were interpreted to apply to human capital contracts, they would
remove most of the benefit of such structures, since they would prevent
an unenforceable wagering agreement because the student counterparty is hedg-
ing risk. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
152. “Private education loans” are subject to numerous reporting require-
ments under Section 128(e) of the Truth in Lending Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1638(e)(1) (2012).  These disclosures fit poorly with (or they are impossible to
comply with) human capital contracts.  For example, the lender must report “(A)
the potential range of rates of interest applicable to the private education loan; . . .
[and] (C) limitations on interest rate adjustments, both in terms of frequency and
amount, or the lack thereof, if applicable.” Id.
153. The extent to which characterizing human capital contracts as loans
would limit their pricing—and the limits that would apply—depends on a variety
of factors surrounding usury laws.  State usury laws restrict the amount of interest
that lenders can charge on consumer loans.  Though these laws can appear to
impose straightforward rate limits, this is often not the case.  For example, in some
cases usury limits are preempted by federal law (such as home equity loans).  Fed-
eral law also permits federally insured financial institutions to charge the highest
interest rate limits permitted among the various states in which they are located,
undermining the implementation of state usury laws with lower limits.  In addition,
(1) state usury laws contain numerous exceptions, such as for retail installment
loans and loans issued by certain types of institutions (e.g., credit unions); (2)
interest rate ceilings may be higher than they appear due to special rules for com-
pounding fees, calculating balances and rates; (3) remedies for usury law violation
may be narrow; and (4) contracting parties may avoid usury limits by drafting price
terms in a way that obscures disbursement versus interest components of the trans-
action. See generally Richard M. Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of
Consumer Finance (U. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 117, 2001), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261109 [perma.cc/
YGC3-JE29].
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the contract from capturing much, if any, upside gain from high-earning
graduates.
There is no statutory definition of debt in either the Truth in Lend-
ing Act or the Higher Education Act (HEA), but an essential characteristic
of debt is that it involves a transfer of funds from one party, the lender, to
another party, the borrower, in exchange for a promise of future repay-
ment, usually with interest.154  In the case of the IBR Swap, there is no
initial transfer of funds from the institutional counterparty to student, and
so the relationship cannot be characterized as debt.155  Thus, the IBR
Swap removes ambiguity about whether lending disclosure regimes, rate
ceilings, or usury laws apply.
D. Bankruptcy
Several commentators have mentioned that uncertainty about how
human capital contracts would be treated in bankruptcy creates regulatory
uncertainty.156  For example, if a human capital contract constitutes a
“qualified education loan,” then it is not typically dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy unless the student can show “undue financial hardship,” which is
generally difficult to show.157  Even ignoring issues specific to student
loans, some argue that it would be difficult to figure out how to treat a
human capital contract in bankruptcy.  In a bankruptcy proceeding, the
obligations of the bankrupt party are prioritized, with low priority obliga-
tions being subject to discharge.  There is some fear that a bankruptcy
court would extinguish future obligations under a human capital contract
unless it was classified as a private student loan under the HEA.  Since a
human capital contract represents a long-term obligation, and the risk of
under-earning likely is highest early in the term of the agreement, extin-
guishing the obligation in bankruptcy early in the term of the agreement
would be problematic.  That uncertainty poses some risk to the investor158
and may serve to increase the cost of the human capital contract.
Unlike a human capital contract, an IBR Swap is not a liability for a
low-earning student, but an asset.  Remember, a student who earns less
than the “break-even” income receives a net benefit from the institutional
counterparty.  The amount that the institutional counterparty pays to the
student is more than the student pays to the institutional counterparty, and
154. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 57, at 144 (“If a swap is a debt instrument, it
must have been issued either for money . . . or for property . . . .”).
155. See, e.g., id. at 156 (stating that payments made under interest rate swaps
are not interest because there is no underlying debt (citing H.R. Rep. No. 3838,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 457 (1985))).
156. See, e.g., PALACIOS ET AL., INVESTING IN VALUE, supra note 24, at 13; Jacobs
& van Wijnbergen, supra note 16, at 5.
157. See 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (2012).
158. Since a human capital contract adjusts by its terms to the investee’s abil-
ity to pay, it is not as substantial a burden on a low-earning student, and thus the
need to discharge it in bankruptcy is dramatically diminished.  But, presumably,
there is still some possible risk.
39
Leff and Hughes: Student Loan Derivatives: Improving on Income-Based Approaches to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
138 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 99
so every month the IBR Swap makes the student richer than they would be
without the IBR Swap.  Thus, a student whose income is so low as to result
in bankruptcy would not want to have their IBR Swap discharged.  Far
from it, the IBR Swap is the one thing that is enabling the student to make
their presumably non-dischargeable student loan debt payments possible.
Thus, the IBR Swap may avoid the possibility of discharging the student’s
obligation because of bankruptcy.
Literature on treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy generally con-
cerns Chapter 11 re-organization and the status of derivatives with two in-
stitutional counterparties.159  In the IBR Swap context, the effect of
student counterparty bankruptcy may be significantly different from that
of institutional counterparty bankruptcy.  In the event a student
counterparty enters bankruptcy, the fact that an IBR Swap is an asset
rather than a liability makes its treatment different from human capital
contracts, but that does not dispose of all questions surrounding bank-
ruptcy treatment.  Because the IBR Swap represents a novel transaction,
such a question would require jurisdiction-specific analysis by attorneys
preparing documentation and counseling prospective institutional
counterparties.
The possibility that an institutional counterparty could be undercapi-
talized and default or even seek bankruptcy protection to avoid payments
to student counterparties also warrants careful consideration.  Regulation
to assure capital adequacy or otherwise protect students against institu-
tional counterparty credit risk would need to accompany any implementa-
tion of an IBR Swap market.160
E. Tax
While bankruptcy occurs only in extreme cases, every investor and
student-party to an income-share agreement has to decide how to treat the
investment for tax purposes.  Some commentators identify tax uncertainty
as an important impediment to human capital contracts,161 and the au-
thors of H.R. 4436 consider it significant enough to propose definitive tax
treatment.162  The tax treatment of the IBR Swap is more certain than that
of a human capital contract.  That said, it is probably not especially
favorable treatment.
159. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119
YALE L.J. 648 (2010); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Finan-
cial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011).
160. See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, Human Equity?, supra note 24, at 744–46.
162. See H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. § 201 (2d Sess. 2014) (providing that pay-
ments made from investor to student are not includible in student’s income, and
payment of future income to investor constitute tax-free recovery of capital for
investor until full amount of investment is recovered, after which time they are
taxable income).
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There are many possible options for how to treat a human capital
contract for tax purposes.  If it is debt, then the receipt of the initial pay-
ment from the investor to the student is not a taxable event for either
party—the student does not treat it as income, and the investor cannot
deduct the payment from its income for tax purposes.  When the student
makes percentage-of-income payments back to the investor, those pay-
ments are partially a tax-free “return of capital” and partially “interest.”
Return of capital has no tax implications, but interest is income to the
investor, and, importantly, it is income at the “ordinary” rather than at the
lower “capital gains” rate.163  But if a human capital contract is debt for
tax purposes, a method must be employed for separating the return of
capital from the interest.  Just as was the case when we discussed lending
law, the structure of a human capital contract makes it impossible to calcu-
late a “rate,” and so there is no easy way to distinguish “interest” from
“return of capital.”164
If the human capital contract is not treated as debt, it could be
treated in a number of other ways, each of which provides a different solu-
tion to the problem of how to distinguish the tax-free return of capital
from taxable income.  At least one commentator has raised the possibility
that the best way to view at least some human capital contracts is as a part-
nership or joint venture, in which case the student’s income would be allo-
cated between the student and the investor for tax purposes, with one (but
not both) paying tax on all of it.165  This treatment would be extremely
complicated, although it might be favorable to the parties collectively.166
More likely, a human capital contract would be taxed like some simi-
lar investment vehicle.  For example, if it was considered more “insurance-
like,” it might be taxed as an “annuity.”167  It could also be taxed pursuant
to the “open transaction” doctrine, in which the first money received by
the investor from the student is all return of capital, and only after all is
163. For the student, the interest may be deductible under certain circum-
stances.  For example, if the human capital contract were incurred in the course of
the student’s existing trade or business, then the interest would be deductible.
However, if it were incurred for education, even professional education, it would
likely not be deductible, unless it was deductible as student loan interest, which is
subject to numerous limitations and exemptions.
164. In addition to being uncertain, this treatment would probably not be
preferred by taxpayers, because there is no opportunity to defer the taxation of
income and interest is taxed at the full ordinary income rate.
165. See Oei & Ring, Human Equity?, supra note 24, at 723–25.
166. The student’s earnings would somehow be treated as partnership in-
come subject to allocation between the parties pursuant to Subchapter K of the
Internal Revenue Code.  Payments from the student to the investor would be distri-
butions, as would payments from the “partnership” into the student’s own personal
bank account.
167. 26 U.S.C. § 72 (2012).  Under annuity treatment, capital is allocated pro
rata over the years of the term of the annuity, and so each year an equal amount
would be tax-free return of capital.  Any amount exceeding this amount would be
income to the investor.
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received is the rest taxed as income.168  This uncertainty creates tax
problems, though it also creates tax opportunities, since some of the po-
tential treatments of the transaction would be favorable from a tax per-
spective for the investors at least.169
In the case of an IBR Swap, the tax treatment is more certain (even if
not particularly favorable).  That is because in an IBR Swap, there is no
upfront payment from one party to the other.  Instead, each party agrees
to make reciprocal payments to each other.  The proposed methods of
taxing payments made under a human capital contract discussed
above—debt/interest treatment, annuity treatment, open transaction doc-
trine, among others—are all methods of distinguishing tax-free return of
principal from taxable income.  But when there is no up-front investment
in the transaction, none of these methods apply.  Furthermore, when
there is an upfront investment in a financial product, there is a question of
whether the gains that accrue to that product are ordinary income or capi-
tal gains.  When there is no upfront investment, ordinary-income treat-
ment makes the most sense.
The tax treatment of an IBR Swap, however, is still subject to some
uncertainty.  Congress has expressly provided for the tax treatment of
most swap transactions.  Section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code gov-
erns the taxation of so-called notional principal contracts.  While the defi-
nition of a “notional principal contract” at first blush would appear to
include an IBR Swap, in fact, the IBR Swap is probably not a notional
principal contract under the Code.170  To qualify as such, each “leg” of the
168. See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413–14 (1931).
169. Unsurprisingly, H.R. 4436 seeks to clarify the tax treatment of qualifying
income-share agreements.  Under H.R. 4436, the treatment is essentially the same
as it would be under the open transaction doctrine, which is the most favorable
treatment for the investor.  The initial payment from the investor to the student is
excluded from income of the investee, just as it would be if it was debt, and the
return payments are tax-free return of capital until the whole invested amount is
paid back.  After that, payments are income to the investor.  H.R. 4436, 113th
Cong. § 201(a) (2d. Sess. 2014).
170. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (2016) (“A notional principal contract is
a financial instrument that provides for the payment of amounts by one party to
another at specified intervals calculated by reference to a specified index upon a
notional principal amount in exchange for specified consideration or a promise to
pay similar amounts.”).  The IBR Swap is a financial instrument in which one party
(the institutional investor) agrees to pay amounts at specified intervals (probably
monthly) to another party (the student) by reference to a specified index (proba-
bly a fixed percentage) upon a notional amount (the amount the student bor-
rowed in student loans) in exchange for a promise to pay.  The question is whether
the promise is to a pay a “similar amount.”  And while the payments from the
student to the institutional investor are paid at specified intervals, they are not
calculated by reference to a specified index, because the regulations state explicitly
that “a specified index” is “an index that is based on objective financial informa-
tion . . . .” Id. § 1.446-3(c)(2)(iii).  And “objective financial information” cannot
be “within the control of any of the parties to the contract.” Id. § 1.446-3(c)(4)(ii).
Because the student’s income is (more or less) within the student’s control, an
index based on that information cannot be a “specified index” under the regula-
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swap has to be calculated based on a measurement that is not “within the
control of any of the parties to the contract.”171  Because the student’s
income is (more or less) within the student’s control, the IBR Swap would
not likely qualify as a notional principal contract.
When a contract to exchange reciprocal payments fails to qualify as a
notional principal contract, it is presumably taxed according to general
principles of tax law.  The most likely treatment would be that the recipro-
cal payments over the course of the tax year would be “netted” so that one
party has an aggregate annual payment that is positive, and the other party
has an exactly corresponding negative annual aggregate.172  The party
with the positive annual payments would pay tax on that positive amount
as “ordinary income.”  The party whose payments were negative would pre-
sumably have an “ordinary loss.”
V. CONSIDERING REGULATORY ISSUES
The unique structure of the IBR Swap reduces the regulatory uncer-
tainty that undermines human capital contracts and other income-share
agreements under current law.  However, the fact that the legal treatment
of IBR Swaps under current law is more certain than that of human capital
contracts does not exempt IBR Swaps from implicating regulatory and eth-
ical issues.  On the contrary, IBR Swaps raise a host of problematic issues
that deserve careful consideration.  No study to date has systematically ex-
amined the regulatory tradeoffs inherent in designing a system of higher
education financing that includes various types of income-share agree-
ments.173  Nor do we attempt such a systematic study here.  Instead, in this
Section we identify three obvious regulatory concerns: the issue of disclo-
sure requirements to protect student counterparties, the issue of institu-
tional counterparty solvency or credit risk, and the issue of differential
pricing and adverse selection.
As discussed above, those who are in favor of human capital contracts
should also be in favor of IBR Swaps.  But if you are alarmed (or even
horrified) by the possibility of a world in which human capital contracts
are the primary mode for financing higher education, then you probably
oppose IBR Swaps.  Thus far, this Article has discussed how IBR Swaps are
like human capital contracts, but “better” in the sense that they are more
efficient and do not suffer from the same regulatory impediments.  We
have thus far deferred a discussion about potential drawbacks of income-
share agreements that warrant regulation.  The Rubio–Petri Legislation
clears some of the legal hurdles that impede the development of a market
tions, and the instrument that is based on it (the IBR Swap) is not a notional
principal contract for tax purposes.
171. Id.
172. See generally Brown, supra note 57, at 162–65.
173. Although several scholars have made good starts. See, e.g., Oei & Ring,
Human Equity?, supra note 24; Schwartz, supra note 24.
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for income-share agreements, but it does little to regulate the market it
purports to create.174  Drawbacks to a market for income-share agree-
ments potentially include risk that income-share agreements could exacer-
bate income and other forms of inequality, diminish access to education
for some qualified students, raise the cost of education for some students,
accelerate the withdrawal of public support for education,175 and gener-
ally lead to a society that is less egalitarian, less educated, and all around
worse.  It is possible, though, that well-constructed regulations can manage
each potential drawback such that the benefits of an IBR Swap program
outweigh the detriments.
Law students entering IBR Swaps are consumer counterparties trans-
acting with more sophisticated institutional actors.  Unless a public or pri-
vate governing body standardizes contract forms or specifies disclosure
requirements for IBR Swap transactions, student counterparties could be
at risk of committing to contract terms that they have not contemplated
and do not like.  Disclosure requirements are common regulatory tools in
a variety of market contexts where consumer protection is a concern.176
Along with disclosure, standardization of contract terms is also a common
regulatory strategy to reduce information costs.  If an IBR Swap market
arose, law schools, consumer advocates, and institutional counterparties
would want to determine the best regulatory body to develop disclosure
rules.  In some markets, federal bureaus regulate disclosure,177 in others
state or local laws do so,178 and in still others this responsibility is met by
private industry-specific organizations.179
174. Note that the current version of the Bill (1) prevents investors from con-
trolling investees’ actions, (2) requires that income below $18,000 does not trigger
repayment, (3) provides a ceiling on the percentage of income that can be
charged, (4) provides an aggregate limit on the percentage of income any one
student can commit, (5) provides a sliding limit on how long a repayment period
can be required, and (6) requires that ISAs include a series of disclosures. See
Investing in Student Success Act of 2015, H.R. 3432, 114th Cong. §§ 103(a)(1),
(3)–(5), 103(b), 103(c) (1st sess. 2015).
175. See, e.g., ASHER ET AL., supra note 71 (arguing that income-driven repay-
ment programs may take pressure off governments or institutions to make educa-
tion more affordable).
176. For example, as discussed supra note 152, student loans are subject to
disclosure requirements under the Truth in Lending Act.
177. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau implements
numerous disclosure requirements pertaining to home mortgages and student
loans, pursuant to Title XIV of Dodd-Frank. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5511
(2012); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1638; Regulatory Implementation, CON-
SUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulatory-im-
plementation [https://perma.cc/9X7Q-XY2Y] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
178. For example, the market for rental housing is frequently regulated by
local authorities that require disclosure of terms and tenants’ rights. See, e.g., D.C.
Municipal Regulations and D.C. Register, SECRETARY D.C., OFF. DOCUMENTS & ADMIN.
ISSUANCES, available at http://www.dcregs.dc.gov/Gateway/ChapterHome.aspx?
ChapterNumber=14-3 [https://perma.cc/Q2CT-SFS5] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
179. Real estate brokers’ associations are one example of this. See, e.g.,
Greater Boston Real Estate Bd., Standard Form Purchase & Sale Agreement (Form
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A second obvious concern that regulation should address is the risk to
student counterparties of institutional counterparty default.  Student
counterparties may make career decisions by relying on an IBR Swap
transaction.  If an institutional counterparty becomes insolvent or other-
wise defaults, a student counterparty could be left without capacity to meet
student loan obligations.  Regulations designed to protect certain types of
parties to particular transactions from counterparty default risk are com-
mon.  In derivatives markets generally, regulations requiring that transac-
tions take place on an exchange or through a clearinghouse address
counterparty credit risk concerns.180  The exchange or clearinghouse
meets swap obligations, absorbing risk of counterparty default.  In insur-
ance markets, capital adequacy requirements protect policyholders from
underwriter insolvency.181  In many markets, assignments of collateral se-
cure counterparty performance, enhancing credit.182  In the IBR Swap
context, again, interested parties and policy-makers would need to deter-
mine the appropriate regulatory body and the nature of credit enhance-
ment requirements.  IBR Swaps could be traded on a private
clearinghouse established by an association of law schools and institutional
counterparties.183  Or, state or federal regulators could impose capital ad-
equacy requirements on institutional counterparties.  Formulating and en-
forcing regulations to protect students from institutional counterparty
credit risk, like disclosure requirements, questions of political will.  The
requirements themselves are not exceedingly difficult to design or
enforce.
The remainder of this Section discusses in greater detail the issue of
“differential” or “discriminatory” pricing, one of the aspects of income-
share agreements that is both a feature and a bug.  While regulating to
protect student counterparties from obtuse or disadvantageous terms and
from institutional counterparty credit risk is fairly straightforward (and
faces hurdles primarily of political will), differential pricing and adverse
selection present more complex regulatory challenges.  Here, we briefly
examine the regulatory tradeoffs surrounding differential pricing that
could constrain potential harms of IBR Swaps.
ID: RA700) (Mar. 2006), available at http://thehomebuyingmentors.org/files/
2015/01/GREB-Standard-PS-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS9S-8CAK].
180. See Dodd-Frank Act § 723; CEA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(h)1, 2(h)7 (2012).
181. See Henderson, supra note 53; Hunt, supra note 132.
182. See generally Collateral, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2.isda
.org/functional-areas/infrastructure-management/collateral [https://perma.cc/
2WMC-NNV2] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016) (“contain[ing] [c]ollateral information
and certain informational documents for the Standard Credit Support Annex
(SCSA®), which seeks to standardize market practice regarding embedded option-
ality in current CSAs . . . and align the mechanics and economics of collateraliza-
tion between the bilateral and cleared OTC derivative markets”).
183. This option may not be feasible; for example, a clearinghouse structure
may involve margin requirements that would be unworkable for student
counterparties. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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A. Differential or Discriminatory Pricing
The primary variable in imagining a market for income-share agree-
ments is the range of factors involved in pricing the agreements.  The stu-
dent-loan market is divided into two submarkets that operate very
differently with respect to differential pricing.  The bulk of loans for
higher education are government loans, and these loans have interest
rates fixed by statute that are the same for all qualified borrowers.  But
there is also a significant market for private loans for higher education,
and these loans carry rates that are priced differently depending on a vari-
ety of factors, including the creditworthiness of the borrower or guaran-
tor, the loan default rate of the school the borrower is attending, and
other factors.  In the private student loan context, students are protected
against discrimination on the basis of race and other factors by the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).184  But, as discussed above, unless the
law is changed, IBR Swaps would not be considered student loans and so
would not be subject to ECOA.  Furthermore, because IBR Swaps could be
used in conjunction with government loans, a vibrant IBR Swap market
could introduce differential pricing into the existing market for govern-
ment loans as well as avoid the regulation of discriminatory lending that
currently applies to the private student loan market.
There is nothing inherent in IBR Swaps that requires them to be dif-
ferentially priced.  A governmentally controlled IBR Swap program could
offer some of the benefits of ISAs without any differential pricing.  But all
commentators assume that private income-share agreements would not be
available to all students on the same terms the way the government’s in-
come-based payment plans are.185  Rather, a market would develop in
which income-share agreements are differentially priced based on some
criteria that investors believe predict high-earning graduates.  As discussed
above, most of the commentators thus far have assumed that income-share
agreements for undergraduate education would be differentially priced
based on undergraduate major, with “high earning” majors like engineer-
ing commanding lower priced income-share agreements, while “low earn-
ing” majors like English would have to pay higher prices for their income-
share agreement.  In other words, an English major may be able to borrow
$10,000 in exchange for 2% of their income, while a petroleum engineer-
ing major may be able to borrow the same $10,000 in exchange for only
1% of their income.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor
to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction—(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or mari-
tal status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract); (2) because
all or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance pro-
gram  . . . .”).  ECOA is implemented by Regulation B (12 C.F.R. pt. 202) and
enforced by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which also has the author-
ity to promulgate implementing regulations for it. See id. § 1691b.
185. See supra note 24.
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merits of this particular assumption, but we are both skeptical of the evi-
dence that supports it and unenthusiastic about the effects a market would
have if college major was the primary driver of differential pricing.186
But there is no reason that course of study would necessarily be the
dominant factor that would determine the price of an income-share agree-
ment.  Choice of school could be a significant factor in differential pric-
ing, especially in the law school context.187  If investors determined that
graduates of highly-ranked law schools on average made more money than
graduates of low-ranked law schools, then they could charge more to stu-
dents of low-ranked law schools for their income-share agreements.188  If
they estimated that Ben, a student of a low-ranked law school was likely to
earn half as much as Heather, a student of a high-ranked law school, they
might charge Ben 2% of his future income for every $10,000 borrowed,
while they charge Heather only 1% for the same $10,000.  Remember, that
does not mean that Ben will pay more than Heather for his education.  If
the investors are predicting correctly, and if Ben and Heather earn the
average amount for their schools, they will each pay the same amount for
their education.  It will just be a higher percentage of income for Ben than
for Heather.189  The same is true of debt—if they earn the average
amount for their schools, then Ben pays a higher percentage of his in-
come than Heather, even though they pay the same amount of money.
But, obviously, the investors might not predict accurately or Heather and
Ben might not be average.  If Ben is above average for his school then he will
pay more for his education than someone who is average for their school.  If
he is below average for his school then he will pay less.  If Ben and Heather
earn the same amount as each other, then Ben, who is dramatically out-
performing the other students from his school, will pay much more than
Heather, who is earning the average for her school.  That may seem un-
fair.  It may even contribute to social inequality, since students from low-
income backgrounds may be more likely to attend lower ranked schools.
186. Avoiding a robust discussion of exactly this issue was one of the reasons
we chose to focus on law school financing in this Article.  For a critique of differen-
tial pricing in the undergraduate context, see Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupport-
able Cost of Variable Pricing of Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137 (2013).
187. In the private student loan market, a version of this school-based differ-
ential pricing operates to raise the price of loans for students attending certain
schools that have high aggregate default rates on student loans.
188. The rankings mentioned in this hypothetical are the graduate school
rankings published annually by the U.S. News and World Report.  It is widely be-
lieved that graduates of higher ranked law schools earn more on average than
graduates of lower ranked law schools.
189. Remember, that is how it currently works with fixed-rate debt.  If Ben
earns half Heather’s salary, he pays twice as much for his education as she does, as
a percentage of his income. See supra note 82.  Of course, Ben and Heather are paying
the same amount in absolute terms if they both borrow the same amount of fixed-
rate debt, unless one or the other defaults or takes advantage of a governmental
repayment program.
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But the possibilities of differential pricing do not end there.  It is
likely that school will not be the only meaningful pricing factor for an
investor in income-share agreements.  Absent any rule or law to the con-
trary, an investor could use more personal factors, such as undergraduate
GPA or an LSAT score.  These “scores-based” factors would have a very
different impact than schools-based factors.  Even worse than scores-based
differential pricing is differential pricing based on other personal factors.
For example, we know that women on average earn less than men, and so,
absent any law preventing it, one could imagine a world in which Heather
and Ben have identical LSATs and GPAs and go to the same school, but
Heather’s income-share agreement costs more than Ben’s just because she
is a woman.190  Similarly, we know that children of high-earning parents
are more likely to be high-earners themselves than children of low-earning
parents, even when other factors are controlled.  One could imagine a
world in which income-share agreements are priced largely based on the
earnings history of the student’s parents.  One could imagine a world in
which race is a factor.191  Again, these pricing strategies would mean that
students who ended up earning the same amount would pay different
amounts based on sex or parental income or race.  And the difference
190. As discussed above, supra note 184, ECOA prevents discrimination on
the basis of sex in the private student loan context, but without legislative or regu-
latory change, ECOA would not apply to income-share agreements.  It would be
relatively easy to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex or race just by includ-
ing income-share agreements in the definition of student loans for the purposes of
ECOA.  While there is room for debate on this subject, the Rubio–Petri Legislation
arguably accomplishes this by providing that an income-share agreement that
meets the requirements of the bill is defined as “qualified education loan” under
Section 221(d) of the Internal Revenue Code. See H.R. 3432, 114th Cong.
§ 301(a) (1st sess. 2015).  Once the instrument is described as a “qualified educa-
tion loan, it is presumably “credit” which is subject to ECOA. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691a(d) (2012) (“The term ‘credit’ means the right granted by a creditor to a
debtor . . . to incur debts and defer its payment . . . .”); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(j) (2016)
(“Credit means the right granted by a creditor to an applicant to . . . incur debt
and defer its payment . . . .”).  With respect to the IBR Swap, which does not consti-
tute debt absent some law or regulation to the contrary, the Rubio–Petri Bill could
change the debt analysis for any IBR Swap that qualified as an ISA under the Bill.
191. Race, like sex, is covered under ECOA. See 15 U.S.C. § 169a(d).  It is
worth mentioning in this context, that discrimination can be found under ECOA
under either a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact. See CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS: EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTU-
NITY ACT 1 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb
_laws-and-regulations_ecoa-combined-june-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/J54E-ND
NH] (“Disparate impact occurs when a creditor employs facially neutral policies or
practices that have an adverse effect or impact on a member of a protected class
unless it meets a legitimate business need that cannot reasonably be achieved by
means that are less disparate in their impact.”); see also Rodriguez v. SLM Corp.,
No. 07cv1866 (WWE), 2009 WL 598252, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 6, 2009)(“In light of
the early stage of this action and the recent decisions that [Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228 (2005)] does not preclude ECOA disparate impact claims as recog-
nized in pre-Smith precedent, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss on this
ground.”).
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would undermine egalitarianism in access to education: the children of
high earners would pay less than the children of low earners.192
B. Regulating Differential Pricing
Congress could create a regulatory regime that would control which
factors could be used in pricing income-share agreements.  Lawmakers
could mandate that the price of an income-share agreement not vary
based on sex or race or parental income.193  They could mandate that the
price be based solely on school attended or even course of study, with
students of all law schools paying the same amount.
The problem with such regulation is that it represents a tradeoff in
two ways.  First, the information-gathering potential of income-share
agreements depends on differential pricing.  When the investors set a dif-
ferent price for students with different factors, it communicates to the stu-
dent the market’s estimation of the relative importance of those factors to
the students’ future earnings.  If the government prevents differential
pricing based on LSAT or undergraduate GPA, for example, it prevents
students from learning anything about their own earning potential based
on their LSATs or undergraduate GPAs.  After all, either thing may be
irrelevant or highly relevant.  The dream of many income-share agree-
ment supporters is that permitting people to make money from accurately
predicting students’ earnings would fuel investment into exactly these
questions, and the price would communicate the findings.
The second tradeoff in regulating differential pricing is so-called reg-
ulatory adverse selection. Adverse selection is the term used to describe a
central problem in insurance markets.  Traditional adverse selection arises
when insurers and insureds have “asymmetric information” about the risks
posed to the insured.  For example, an insurer providing life insurance
may know that the overall probability of a forty-six-year-old man dying in
the next year is 2%.  If the only information he had about the insured was
his age and sex, then he would price the one year of life insurance based
on that 2% chance of the insured dying in the coming year.  But the
chance of a forty-six-year-old man who is diagnosed with advanced lung
cancer dying in the next year may be as high as 50%.  If the insured knows
that he has cancer, but the insurer does not, then there is an informa-
tional asymmetry.  If the insurer prices the insurance based on its knowl-
edge of the general population of forty-six-year-old men, then the
insurance will be a bargain for the man with cancer.
Assuming that the insurer cannot discover which people are diag-
nosed with cancer, it will have to price its insurance slightly higher than it
192. Remember, privileged students would pay less as a percentage of their in-
come, but they would pay the same amount if both parties earned the amount they
were projected to earn.
193. The easiest way to protect against discrimination in ISA pricing would be
to include ISAs in the instruments covered by ECOA. See supra note 190.
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otherwise would, because it knows that people with cancer are more likely
to purchase it than people without cancer.  As the insurer increases the
price of the insurance to take into account those people who know they
have cancer, the insurance becomes less attractive to people who do not
have cancer, and they purchase less, driving the price even higher.  That
tendency for asymmetric information to encourage high-risk individuals to
acquire more insurance, and thereby drive low-risk individuals out of the
market, is called “adverse selection.”  In extreme cases, adverse selection
can cause a “death spiral” as low-risk insureds opt out of the market, driv-
ing up the price, thereby causing more low-risk insureds to exit the
market.
In education financing, adverse selection potentially exists whether
financing is provided in the form of debt or an income-share agreement.
In the case of income-share agreements, any information that accurately
predicts earnings—and that is known to students but not investors—is rel-
evant to the adverse selection issue.  For example, if a student knows that
they want to work in public interest law and that salaries are very low there,
then they present a greater-than-normal risk of low earnings.  Similarly, if
a student has a personal contact at a high-paying law firm, they potentially
present a greater-than-normal chance of high earnings.  If the low-earning
student opts in to the human capital contract market, and the high-earn-
ing student opts out, the adverse selection problem may be acute.  That is
because personal commitments and personal contacts are private informa-
tion held by the student and not available to the investors.
But adverse selection problems arise not only through asymmetric in-
formation, but also when both parties have access to information.  How-
ever, the insurer is prohibited by law to take that information into account
in setting rates.  This kind of adverse selection is sometimes called regula-
tory adverse selection to emphasize the fact that it arises out of the legal re-
gime, rather than out of asymmetrical information.194  So, for example,
the fact that federal law prohibits insurers from considering preexisting
conditions when providing or pricing health insurance creates the poten-
tial for regulatory adverse selection.195  In the case of income-share agree-
ments, any regulatory regime that limits the factors that investors can
consider in pricing the contracts could create or exacerbate the adverse
selection problem.  Even banning only the most disturbing forms of price
discrimination could potentially cause regulatory adverse selection.  For
example, if the government banned sex discrimination in pricing income-
share agreements, women (who are at greater risk of low earnings) might
opt in to the program, while men  (who have a greater likelihood of high
earnings) opt out.  In this scenario, the average price would go up.
194. Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding Insur-
ance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 204 (2014).
195. The so-called individual mandate, which requires almost all persons to
purchase health insurance, is an attempt to overcome at least some of the potential
adverse selection caused by the prohibition.
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In the income-share agreement market, regulatory adverse selection
could also occur if investors were constrained from taking into account
any other individual factor, like family wealth, grades, LSAT scores, or any-
thing else.  It is conceivable that adverse selection could be prevalent
enough in a market for human capital contracts to cause a “death spiral.”
In that case, no market could develop for income-share agreements, and it
would be necessary for the government to intervene, either with some sort
of “individual mandate” or by subsidizing income-share agreements
enough to counter the costs of adverse selection.
Ultimately, the question of whether asymmetrical information or reg-
ulatory adverse selection would destroy a voluntary market for income-
share agreements is an empirical one.  There are some reasons to believe
that the adverse selection problem may not be as bad as one might fear, at
least if students are required to make their choice about whether to par-
ticipate before they start their law school career.  As for information asym-
metries, the consensus appears to be that at the point students enter
school, they have very little reliable information about their future earning
capabilities at graduation, at least in the law school context.  Remember,
for adverse selection to be a concern, students would have to know more
about their individual earning potential than the investors.196  Most evi-
dence suggests that at least prospective law students have very little private
information about themselves that would enable them to make better pre-
dictions about their earning potential than investors.197  Even the classic
example of the student who plans to go into a low-earning field like public
interest appears to be largely a myth.  Most students do a bad job at the
outset of law school predicting what kind of law they will practice, and so-
called public interest careers are not the main cause of low earning among
law school graduates.
Regulatory adverse selection may also pose less of a problem than one
might assume if individual characteristics are not very predictive of future
earnings.  Transaction costs already limit the individual factors that insur-
ers use to price insurance, and only those whose predictive ability justifies
the price of collecting the information are likely to be used.  It may well be
that the factors that are prohibited—even if they include scores or paren-
tal income—are just not significant enough to cause a death spiral in the
market.  After all, we had a robust health insurance market prior to the
Affordable Care Act with a significant number of antidiscrimination provi-
196. See Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 24, at 110–13.
197. See PALACIOS ET AL., INVESTING IN VALUE, SHARING RISK, supra note 24, at
11 (giving good general introduction to adverse selection problem faced by
human capital contracts).
Given that students are often not very accurate in projecting their future
income and typically have low levels of knowledge about the labor mar-
ket, however, investors will most likely have better information than stu-
dents about their future economic prospects in particular courses of
study at particular institutions.
Id.
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sions.  It presumably was the ban on pricing based on preexisting condi-
tions that legislators thought would be the straw that broke the camel’s
back to necessitate the individual mandate.
In regulating income-share agreements, legislators would have to
make a similar judgment about which pricing factors could be prohibited
without destroying the market and which would be too much.  If skepti-
cism about the predictive power of various characteristics is warranted,
then regulatory arbitrage may not be such a significant problem.  On the
other hand, if no factor does a good job of predicting earnings, then the
“information-gathering” power of income-share agreements will probably
be less powerful than some commentators hope.  These two issues—regu-
latory adverse selection and differential pricing—are inherently
connected.
In summary, the point here is that the creation of a market for in-
come-share agreements might necessitate new regulation, and this new
regulation would implicate a series of policy trade-offs.  We leave a system-
atic examination of these policy tradeoffs to another day.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced a novel financial instrument that has both
strengths and weaknesses.  One of the benefits of a financial innovation
like the IBR Swap is how flexible it is to adapt to a variety of circumstances.
One example should illustrate how thinking about the IBR Swap may help
policy-makers to see higher education finance in new ways, making crea-
tive policy reform possible.
In July 2013, the Oregon legislature approved a pilot program under
which students can attend state universities for free in exchange for a
promise to pay a percentage of their future income.198  The program,
called “Pay It Forward,” has been stalled for over two years largely because
legislators are unsure of how to fund it.  Because Oregon state schools
would have to forego tuition revenue for any student participating in the
program, the cost would have to be made up elsewhere.  Legislators have
proposed issuing bonds, directing revenue from the state’s lottery, and
other sources of revenue to fund the program.  Pay It Forward is in es-
sence a human capital contract between the state of Oregon and some of
the students at its state schools.
If it wanted to, Oregon could solve its revenue problem by structuring
the Pay It Forward program as a series of IBR Swaps.  Instead of attending
Oregon state schools for free, students would borrow from the federal gov-
ernment the cost of tuition and pay that tuition to the school they attend.
Then, Oregon could agree that it would pay the students’ loan payments
on their behalf, so long as the students pay Oregon a percentage of their
future incomes.  Oregon has estimated that four years of public college
198. See H.B. 3472, 77th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013), available at http:/
/gov.oregonlive.com/bill/2013/HB3472/ [https://perma.cc/7Q5Y-2DR5].
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would cost 3–5% of a student’s income for twenty years.  Therefore, if stu-
dents borrowed enough to pay for four years, Oregon would enter into
IBR Swaps with them in which it paid off their student loans, and they paid
Oregon 3–5% of their incomes for twenty years.  From the student’s per-
spective, a Pay It Forward program structured around an IBR Swap is al-
most identical to the currently proposed Pay It Forward program.  From
Oregon’s perspective, the primary benefit of an IBR Swap model is that it
does not need to come up with upfront capital to fund its Pay It Forward
Program.
The ways that the IBR Swap opens possibilities for Oregon and others
is just the beginning of the conversation, however.  It is crucial that we
bring both creativity and detailed attention to the possibilities that in-
come-based education finance presents.  The IBR Swap combines struc-
tural and financial advantages of derivatives with the appeal of income-
based approaches to paying for law school.  But the benefits of the IBR
Swap from a financial engineering perspective only make starker the po-
tential social problems that could arise from an unregulated market for
income-share agreements.  The IBR Swap concept should inspire reexami-
nation of the best role for government in higher education finance and
the importance of channeling public funds to their best uses.  Now is the
time to explore innovations like the IBR Swap, as legal education strives to
better match costs and capital to educate the next generation of lawyers.
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